{"id":748,"title":"GED LAB Series Part I &#8211; How to Get Out of the Crisis?","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/globalization\/ged-lab-series-1-get-crisis\/","date":"7. November 2014","date_unix":1415364032,"date_modified_unix":1415364032,"date_iso":"2014-11-07T12:40:32+00:00","content":"<div id=\"c2473\" class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">\n<div class=\"cbox\">\n<p>More often than not in political and economic debates, \u201ctruths are illusions about which one has forgotten that is what they are\u201d. Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche\u2019s statement holds true in many discussions about the financial and fiscal crisis that swept the Old Continent between 2008 and 2012.<\/p>\n<p>In the wake of the Greek fiscal crisis and the collapse of the banking systems in Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, many commentators have argued that the \u201cperiphery countries\u201d were hit by a fiscal crisis because of past budget mismanagement. According to a\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/laursonpieler\/2013\/01\/13\/fiscal-follies-the-pigs-are-at-it-again\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\"  target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">2010 Forbes article<\/a>, \u201cIreland, Portugal, Greece and to a lesser extent Spain dramatize Europe\u2019s struggles with the long-term debt politicians have amassed. The cause is fundamental fiscal incompetence, aggravated\u2013not caused\u2013by the collapse of growth (and associated revenues) in the global recession.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This argument is not entirely without merit. Let\u2019s consider Greece: this interactive graph, extracted from the Bertelsmann Stiftung\u2019s new GED LAB, shows that despite extremely low long-term government bond yields and sustained economic growth, the Greek government exhibited a deficit equal to 5 percent of its GDP in 2005.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"c2487\" class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">[iframe &#8222;http:\/\/public.tableausoftware.com\/profile\/analytix5483#!\/vizhome\/shared\/ZBR8K295M&#8220;]<\/div>\n<div id=\"c2489\" class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">\n<div class=\"cbox\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>However, if we compare these exact same indicators to other periphery countries &#8211;\u00a0here Spain &#8211;\u00a0we see little evidence of fiscal mismanagement. The Spanish government not only had budget surpluses prior to the financial crisis, but it also displayed a rapidly shrinking national debt. Benefiting from low borrowing costs and steady growth, Spain smacked into the crisis in a rather healthy financial situation &#8211;\u00a0even compared to other so-called \u201cvirtuous\u201d European countries.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">[iframe &#8222;http:\/\/public.tableausoftware.com\/profile\/analytix5483#!\/vizhome\/shared\/CPHWXD889&#8220;]<\/div>\n<div id=\"c2490\" class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">\n<div class=\"cbox\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>So was there an overall trend for the periphery countries? The following graph compares the Irish, Italian, Spanish, Greek and Portuguese national debt (as a percent of GDP) to Germany\u2019s. At first glance, Italy appears to be among the sinners \u2013 along with Greece. But despite a fairly high national debt as a percent of GDP, Italy had a shrinking debt to GDP ratio while Germany\u2019s ratio kept rising. Portugal, on the other hand, had a rising debt to GDP ratio, but it remained equal to Germany\u2019s before the crisis. Ireland had a demonstrably healthy financial situation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">[iframe &#8222;http:\/\/public.tableausoftware.com\/profile\/analytix5483#!\/vizhome\/shared\/3SX5TFPFF&#8220;]<\/div>\n<div id=\"c2491\" class=\"csc-layout-0 csc-frame-0\">\n<div class=\"cbox\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>All in all, a quick data overview makes it hard to accuse anyone beyond Greece of \u201cfundamental fiscal incompetence\u201d. Quite obviously, the debt to GDP ratio soared following the series of bank failures after 2008, as economic stabilizers plunged and bailout bills exploded for the periphery nations.<\/p>\n<p>If placing national mismanagement at the heart of the EU crisis is thus not a convincing economic argument, it is also perhaps politically unwise. In a\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.irisheconomy.ie\/index.php\/2011\/05\/01\/the-ecb-is-leading-europe-to-disaster\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\"  target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">2011 article<\/a>, All Souls fellow and economics professor Kevin O\u2019Rourke argued that: \u201cBy confusing fiscal and banking crises in the public mind, the ECB is also fuelling anti-EU sentiment in the core, since core taxpayers understandably resent the notion that they should subsidize feckless peripheral taxpayers. By contrast, greater honesty about the fact that we have a Europe-wide banking crisis would make taxpayers everywhere realize that they have common interests, and a common enemy, namely an out-of-control financial sector.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","excerpt":"<p>In this GED Post we give a data overview examining what role national mismanagement of Greece, Spain and Italy played leading up to the EU crisis.<\/p>\n","thumbnail":null,"thumbnailsquare":null,"authors":[{"id":2075,"name":"GED LAB Series Part I &#8211; How to Get Out of the Crisis?","link":false}],"categories":[{"id":152,"name":"Globalization","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/category\/globalization\/"}],"tags":[]}