Ukraine sees itself as strengthening Europe\u2019s security and is seeking EU accession. But there is apprehension across much of the EU.<\/p>\n
Fighting for their sovereignty in the full-scale war Russia has been waging openly against Ukraine since February 2022, Ukrainians see themselves as defending both their country and Europe\u2019s security and freedom. However, this sense of a shared struggle for a European way of life and European values in the face of Russia\u2019s war of aggression is not matched by support among EU citizens for Ukraine to join the Union in the near future.<\/p>\n
A new representative survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, conducted in the fifth year of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, compares responses from across the EU and selected member states with those from the non-occupied territories of Ukraine. The aim is to shed light on Ukrainians\u2019 and EU residents\u2019 understandings and expectations regarding Ukraine\u2019s deeper integration into the EU and, ultimately, its accession.<\/p>\n
The survey results indicate that most EU respondents do not want Ukraine to join the Union soon. In addition, whereas Ukrainians are willing to accept short-term costs to enable Ukraine\u2019s EU membership, most EU residents are not. Crucially, there are divergent understandings of exactly who is protecting whom from Russia\u2019s imperial aggression.<\/p>\n
These differences in perspective underline the need for greater mutual understanding. The common narrative that EU enlargement is a geopolitical necessity and that the EU needs to have Ukraine as a member state to ensure the EU\u2019s own security and autonomy has not been resonating with EU residents. Rather than merely letting Ukraine continue along a protracted and slow path towards EU membership, policymakers should use strategic communication and a more focused public debate to address misconceptions. Bridging the gap between Ukrainians\u2019 and EU residents\u2019 expectations and anxieties would help mitigate disappointment and lay more solid foundations for an enlargement that would genuinely strengthen the Union.<\/p>\n
Among the European countries hoping to join the EU, Ukraine is a special case. Stripped of their illusions about Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many Europeans welcomed Kyiv\u2019s application. Some even called for an accelerated accession. Yet solidarity with Ukraine gradually faded. By December 2025, when a proposal emerged to include 1 January 2027 as Ukraine\u2019s accession date in a so-called peace plan initiated by the United States, levels of public support for Ukraine\u2019s EU accession among EU residents had already fallen.<\/p>\n
From a Ukrainian perspective, an early date for accession could help offset the concessions that a ceasefire is likely to require \u2013 first and foremost, de facto acceptance of territorial losses. However, a firm commitment to admit Ukraine on a predetermined date would bear little resemblance to the EU\u2019s established accession process. It would sideline the principle of merit-based accession, under which reforms are undertaken before<\/em> a country joins the Union \u2013 thereby sending mixed signals to the EU\u2019s other candidate countries.<\/p>\n To Russia, Ukraine\u2019s accession would only send a signal of strength if it were underpinned by credible security guarantees. Those are in Europe\u2019s interest regardless of Ukraine\u2019s formal accession, and EU member states contribute to them to varying degrees through NATO and bilaterally. Doubts about the reliability of the transatlantic partnership have created a sense of urgency \u2013 both to secure a ceasefire and to prepare Europe for a future when it can defend itself without relying on Washington. As a member state, Ukraine would also be formally covered by the EU\u2019s mutual assistance clause. But this has become a two-way street, as Ukraine\u2019s military capabilities are important to the emerging European security order, especially given that Ukraine has Europe\u2019s only army with large-scale modern combat experience.<\/p>\n Beyond its military capabilities and technological innovations, Ukraine would bring strategic added value to the EU in energy, critical raw materials, agriculture and food security. Nevertheless, the European Commission cannot prevail over the member states, and even after Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s electoral defeat, other governments will not abandon their preconditions. Even supporters of Ukraine\u2019s accession envisage time for adjustments, and a pared-down accession process that dispenses with key elements would also call into question the EU\u2019s character as a community based on the rule of law.<\/p>\n For Ukrainian society, alongside the need to secure a truce, the prospect of EU membership is vital in three respects. Socially, it offers a vision of a future worth holding out for even after years of war. Politically and economically, the goal of EU membership gives a sense of direction amid the toxic combination of domestic political tensions, economic hardship, the gradual depletion of Ukraine\u2019s labour force, and new Russian threats looming in what has become a race of ever-faster military and technological innovation.<\/p>\n EU integration and security cooperation work best in tandem. Security arrangements between the EU and Ukraine that provide credible defence and deterrence are also a prerequisite for improving Ukraine\u2019s weak record when it comes to attracting foreign direct investment. All of this will require openly addressing the anxieties of EU voters rather than waiting for them to eventually accept Ukraine\u2019s accession.<\/p>\n To better understand and address the different expectations and concerns of both EU citizens and Ukrainians, the Bertelsmann Stiftung asked several questions about Ukraine\u2019s potential EU membership in a representative survey of 18,948 individuals, including 16,795 in the EU and 2,153 in the government-controlled parts of Ukraine. Collected by Nira Data in June 2026, the data are representative of the populations of the EU, Ukraine and the selected EU member states included in the analysis.<\/p>\n One of the survey\u2019s key findings is that public opinion in the EU and Ukraine diverges in several ways \u2013 most notably on the question of Ukraine\u2019s potential EU membership.<\/p>\n Figure 1<\/em><\/p>\nThe door and the shield: Divergent views on Ukraine\u2019s EU accession and its implications<\/strong><\/h2>\n