{"id":40077,"title":"Political EU Membership as a Bridge Out of the Geostrategic Grey Zone","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/europe-in-the-world\/political-eu-membership-as-a-bridge-out-of-the-geostrategic-grey-zone\/","date":"11. Juni 2026","date_unix":1781167308,"date_modified_unix":1781170072,"date_iso":"2026-06-11T08:41:48+00:00","content":"

How Berlin and Kyiv Can Guide Ukraine\u2019s Successful Accession to the EU<\/h2>\n

Executive summary<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Ukraine is not a typical case of EU enlargement. Though a recipient of transition assistance, it is also a partner of the EU in the fields of security, innovation, and resources. Its resilience, armed forces, defence industry, energy and infrastructure policies, and reforms are already closely intertwined with pan-European interests. This creates a conflict of objectives: On the one hand, the EU wants to forge a reliable bond with Ukraine for geopolitical reasons. On the other hand, it must not frame Ukraine\u2019s accession as a \u2018special deal\u2019 that dilutes standards, weakens the Single Market or the community based on the rule of law, provokes political backlash in Member States, or undermines European unity.<\/p>\n

The solution lies in a special status: \u2018associate\u2019 \u2013 or, better yet, \u2018political membership\u2019 \u2013 as a preliminary stage to full membership. Rather than a substitute for full membership, it is a hard and fast bridge towards it \u2013 more than candidate status but less than full membership. Security and defence, reconstruction and renewal, reforms and investment would be bundled; Ukraine\u2019s already felt sense of being part of the European family would be acknowledged; and established accession criteria would be upheld.<\/p>\n

This special status should take five points into account:<\/p>\n

\u2022 First, Ukraine should be involved at an early stage and in a meaningful way in EU foreign, security, and defence gatherings.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Second, policy areas relevant to accession should be backstopped by a European recovery and investment framework.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Third, the EU should swiftly enable Ukraine to participate more fully in areas such as energy, digitalization, transport infrastructure, and industrial and research cooperation.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Fourth, Ukraine should be granted full observer status in Council bodies and in the European Parliament.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Fifth, a flexible \u2018rule of law and governance pact\u2019 should strengthen the judiciary, public administration reforms, and institutional capacity.<\/p>\n

For Germany, this presents a key challenge in terms of its EU policy: Berlin can flesh out the concept of \u2018associate membership\u2019 outlined in the coalition agreement, gauge Ukrainian expectations, and convey to sceptical EU Member States and their publics that a reform-oriented Ukraine which is integrated into EU security policy is in the European interest.<\/p>\n

Germany\u2019s policies towards Ukraine and the EU should be based on three priorities:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Work with Kyiv to agree on a political framework for membership and ensure it is palatable in the EU. Develop a roadmap by the end of 2026 for \u2018associate\u2019 or \u2018political\u2019 membership starting on 1 January 2027.<\/li>\n
  2. Hold an intergovernmental conference with Ukraine as soon as possible and formally open at least the \u2018Fundamentals\u2019, \u2018Internal Market\u2019, and \u2018External Relations\u2019 clusters, including foreign, security, and defence policy. Full membership would remain conditional, but formal steps should be taken to secure it by 2035.<\/li>\n
  3. Offer a confidential EU-Ukraine track 1.5 reform dialogue.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    1. Learning from underestimating oneself<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    New EU accessions have always been accompanied by anxieties. Before the \u2018Big Bang\u2019 enlargement of 2004, it was claimed that the new Member States \u2013 with their low standards and wages \u2013 would put pressure on the Single Market, strain the rules, and siphon off funds. For example, Poland was considered too large and too agrarian, and Estonia too poor and post-Soviet. The newcomers would take, but not give.<\/p>\n

    Fortunately, the warnings at that time did not lead to inaction. The fact is that, rather than destroying the EU, its new Member States transformed it politically, economically, and strategically \u2013 and, in many ways, have made it stronger. Estonia, for example, is now a front-runner in digital modernization. What\u2019s more, political crises are by no means confined to the eastern part of the EU, and as long as democratic competition remains intact, they can be resolved.<\/p>\n

    Ukraine is a special case of enlargement<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    The EU should not limit the questions of Ukraine\u2019s belonging within the EU to a traditional accession process. Ukraine would be the largest country geographically to ever be considered for EU membership, and it is in an exposed location given its shared border with the Russian Federation, with its imperial-minded leader in the Kremlin. There is already an enormous need for reconstruction and a comprehensive programme of reforms, against a backdrop of a weak demographic outlook. At the same time, Ukraine has a strong agricultural sector, resources of global significance, the most battle-hardened army in Europe, and the most innovative defence industry.<\/p>\n

    Berlin and Kyiv can resolve this conflict of objectives between speed and soundness<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    In geopolitical terms, there is every reason to securely bind Ukraine to the EU as swiftly as possible. However, in institutional and legal terms, full membership by 2030 is not realistically feasible \u2013 at least not if the EU intends to adhere to the Copenhagen Criteria and safeguard its own ability to act. At the same time, a protracted accession process carries the risk of creating a grey zone, which is not a sound basis for strengthening a free, reform-oriented, and pluralistic Ukraine.<\/p>\n

    The solution does not lie in yet another label for \u2018gradual\u2019 or \u2018sectoral integration\u2019 in the form of early access to the Single Market or full membership with safeguard clauses. Although most contain useful elements, none of the approaches resolves the conflict of political objectives on its own.<\/p>\n

    Political membership as a binding preliminary stage to full membership <\/strong><\/h3>\n

    An initiative launched by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on 18 May of this year may help to resolve the issue. The concept of \u2018associate membership\u2019 is already included in the coalition agreement of the Federal Government that took office in May 2025. The Chancellor\u2019s letter to the leaders of the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the EU outlines the basic idea: Ukraine\u2019s regular participation (without voting rights) in meetings of the European Council and the Council of the European Union; an \u2018Associate Commissioner\u2019 without portfolio; \u2018Associate Members of the European Parliament\u2019 without voting rights; and an \u2018Associate Judge\u2019 at the Court of Justice of the European Union, formally in the role of an \u2018Assistant Rapporteur\u2019.<\/p>\n

    The aim is to make Ukraine\u2019s affiliation with the Union politically binding without compromising the institutional and legal requirements for full membership. And the purpose of this is to signal to Ukrainian society that the prospect of EU membership is a real possibility for their country. Limited participation would be granted at the institutional level. Full rights and obligations would remain tied to traditional criteria.<\/p>\n

    Furthermore, in accordance with Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, Ukraine would receive the backing of the other Member States (via the obligation of mutual assistance) once it fully participates in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. On this, there is already broad agreement.<\/p>\n

    The concept should not be presented or understood as partial membership. Berlin has no intention of continuing the ambivalent EU neighbourhood policy pursued up to 2022 \u2013 but neither does it wish to meet President Volodymyr Zelenskyy\u2019s highest expectations at any cost.<\/p>\n

    The term \u2018associate\u2019 membership is rather unfortunate. It calls to mind the Association Agreement that has been in force between Ukraine and the EU since 2014 as well as the priority of an associate EU membership formulated all the way back in 2001 by then-Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. As a result, the political progress represented by the proposal is sometimes underestimated in Ukraine. Instead, it would be more sensible to talk about \u2018political membership\u2019.<\/p>\n

    While structural reforms are a long and arduous process, geopolitical risks demand swift answers<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    The key advantage of this special status is that the preliminary stage towards full membership would not mean \u2018waiting and seeing\u2019 for either Ukraine or the EU. In addition, full membership would continue to take shape institutionally and legally, with a focus on a realistic and achievable target year (e.g. 2035). This would create a greater sense of being on an equal footing \u2013 with benefits for the candidate exposed to Russian attacks without giving it preferential treatment over other candidates. Political membership for Ukraine must not be presented as a special path that undermines the reform efforts of South-Eastern European candidates or unilaterally ties up limited enlargement capacity in Brussels. Eventually, it should form part of a renewed enlargement architecture that enables all candidates to achieve interim gains.<\/p>\n

    At present, President Zelenskyy remains committed to swift and full EU membership. In doing so, he overlooks the fact that political support for this approach within the EU is, at best, volatile. However, EU citizens must be brought on board; a Union in which centrist political parties are increasingly losing their majorities is of no benefit to either Ukraine or Europe. For this reason, it would be sensible for Ukrainians to weigh the political sentiments in the Member States against their own understandable preferences \u2013 especially in light of the \u2018super election year\u2019 of 2027, which will see nationally significant elections in France, Spain, Italy, and Poland.<\/p>\n

    2. The EU and its Member States have already considered Ukraine a security partner for a long time<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    Since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Brussels has been emphasising that EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment in peace, security, and stability. The formulation is correct \u2013 but it will remain incomplete as long as there is not any follow-up on the institutional level. Special status can help to achieve this by formally recognizing the integration that has de facto been taking place for some time now in terms of security policy. After all, Ukraine is the<\/em> security actor from which all of Europe is benefiting. Ukrainian forces are tying up Russian resources. Ukraine\u2019s experience \u2013 such as in drone development, air defence, cyber defence, and resilience and logistics in times of crisis \u2013 is fundamental to the defence of Europe\u2019s military and society as a whole. In Ukraine, innovation is progressing at a pace that other European procurement structures have not yet been able to match. European companies \u2013 and countries \u2013 are cooperating with the Ukrainian defence industry.<\/p>\n

    Ukraine is already part of the European order and not on its periphery<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    Until now, the EU has paid little attention to the security of EU candidate countries, as the normal procedure was for them to join NATO first. This path is closed to Ukraine for the foreseeable future \u2013 even if some have changed their minds about it.<\/p>\n

    For a long time, Ukraine\u2019s EU membership was rejected in similarly sweeping terms \u2013 with reference to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union and the obligation of mutual assistance set out therein. By 2026 at the latest, there was growing public debate about which EU Member State would assume which defence responsibilities in the event of an emergency. Within the EU, simulation exercises involving high-profile figures are being held to test the triggering of the mutual-defence-clause obligation, such as the one on 4 May of this year involving the national ambassadors of the Political and Security Committee to the Council of the EU.<\/p>\n

    Finally, the German proposal of 18 May of this year explicitly refers to the protection of Ukraine under the EU\u2019s mutual assistance clause, subject to the EU\u2019s adoption of an appropriate Common Foreign and Security Policy. In Chapter 31 of the acquis (On Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy), the Commission has certified that Ukraine has made \u2018good progress\u2019 and reached a \u2018good level of preparation\u2019 for accession. Due to the blockade imposed by Hungary under Viktor Orb\u00e1n, accession negotiations have to date only been conducted on an unofficial basis. Cluster 6, which (in addition to Chapter 31) also covers Chapter 30 (External Relations), is therefore particularly well suited to the forthcoming \u2018alignment\u2019 with the already existing reality (i.e. for official<\/em> negotiations). In this respect, Chancellor Merz\u2019s initiative is in line with President Zelenskyy\u2019s desire to formally<\/em> move the thematic negotiation clusters forward.<\/p>\n

    When it comes to weighing up the risks, it is hard to understand why one would become increasingly intertwined regarding security issues and reliant on Ukrainian capabilities while keeping the same partner at arm\u2019s length in institutional terms. If EU Member States are making use of Ukrainian data, innovation, and deterrence, it is in their own interest to establish a political and legal framework within which this cooperation can take the form of a robust security and defence partnership rather than merely being ad hoc. The special status in question would provide this framework quickly. This would minimise risks rather than increase them in addition to anchoring further developments.<\/p>\n

    3. Reconstruction needs a framework, too<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    The second line of argumentation is economic. The EU will have to help fund Ukraine\u2019s reconstruction, as it has a vital interest in having stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood. For this reason, it is already investing in Ukraine, as demonstrated by the Ukraine Facility<\/a> and the Ukraine Plan<\/a>, as well as through bilateral aid, loans, guarantees, and investment instruments.<\/p>\n

    The special status of \u2018political membership\u2019 could serve as a framework to safeguard EU investment in reconstruction. It would bundle reforms, reconstruction, and EU integration into a single political package \u2013 but without requiring Ukraine to already be fully ready for accession. Nevertheless, it would be acknowledged that the EU has long been invested in Ukraine\u2019s future \u2013 and that this future must be backstopped on an institutional level.<\/p>\n

    Against this backdrop, the current German proposals for regular institutional interlinking are logical; they enhance the political standing of the EU\u2019s Ukrainian partners and enable them to gauge political sentiment first-hand while also having them shoulder greater responsibility. Equally important is Ukraine\u2019s visibility at the \u2018EU table\u2019 for the Ukrainian people \u2013 especially if Ukraine were to hold a referendum on painful compromises aimed at ending the war.<\/p>\n

    It will be more expensive if the EU does not<\/em> reliably bind Ukraine to itself<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    \u2018Political membership\u2019 could help to attract investment because it would provide political backing and planning certainty in the Member States. Furthermore, reconstruction without a credible prospect of EU membership is riskier. Private investors are more cautious when the political environment is uncertain, and public funds can trickle away if the pressure for reform eases.<\/p>\n

    That is precisely what the argument to sceptical Member States should be based on. The cost question should not be: \u2018How much will Ukraine\u2019s accession cost us?\u2019 Instead, it should be: \u2018How much will it cost us to fund Ukraine without forging reliable ties with it?\u2019 The costs of a geopolitical grey zone are harder to quantify than the expenditures for reconstruction and modernization. But the costs are real: the ongoing burden of military expenditures, investment risks, reform fatigue, political disillusionment, and Russian opportunities for influence.<\/p>\n

    4. None of the known expansion models will tip the scales (on its own)<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    \u2018Political membership\u2019 would help to resolve the conflict of objectives surrounding Ukraine\u2019s accession, namely, the trade-off between speed and soundness. This is what sets the proposal apart from other approaches to EU expansion. Even the \u2018reverse enlargement\u2019 concept, recently devised under pressure and based on the principle of \u2018membership first, reforms later\u2019, fails to provide an answer to the question of how reforms or political majorities would subsequently be reliably secured within the Union.<\/p>\n

    Sectoral and gradual integration, on the other hand, are useful, but neither sufficient nor novel \u2013 and they pose challenges when they clash with the particular interests of nation states. Ukraine can and should participate earlier in programmes, energy and digital markets, transport networks, and selected areas of the Single Market. However, the closer it moves towards the Single Market, the more the same criteria of a free market economy and the rule of law should apply: in Ukraine, the courts must be reliable, public authorities and administrations must be independent, competition rules must be fair, and the fight against corruption must be guaranteed. Sectoral and gradual integration are therefore not a convenient way out of accession conditionality.<\/p>\n

    Furthermore, conditionality is not a panacea, even though it is now better coordinated between the IMF and EU instruments in Ukraine. If it is too fragmented, it not only makes the implementation of reforms more difficult, but also shifts the focus towards an (excessively) high level of regulatory density and formal compliance rather than overall impact and institutional effectiveness (formal outputs over systemic outcomes<\/em>). In some cases, excessive conditionality can lead to basic requirements being overlooked. However, the appearance of formally correct individual steps obscures the fact that overarching goals and requirements remain unmet. The prime example of this is the Ukrainian customs service.<\/p>\n

    Overall, the problem is not that there are too few options for Ukraine\u2019s deeper integration into Europe. However, none of these various approaches can make up for a lack of political will \u2013 neither when it comes to Ukrainian decision-makers pushing through and implementing reforms, nor among EU Member States, which must reach an agreement by the end of the accession process at the latest.<\/p>\n

    5. What the special status of \u2018political\u2019 membership can achieve<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    The German initiative should now serve as a catalyst for setting out the binding preliminary steps in detail. The special status \u2013 whatever it is ultimately called \u2013 should be credible, feasible, and palatable to the citizens of EU Member States who are less enthusiastic about enlargement: more than candidate status, less than full membership, and clearly geared towards accession.<\/p>\n

    The \u2018staged accession\u2019 model, in particular, provides guidance in this regard. It was initially designed to address the stalled enlargement process for the EU candidate countries in South-Eastern Europe and was further developed in 2023 as \u2018Template 2.0\u2019: Candidate countries should not wait until the end of the accession process to move closer to the EU, but should do so through clear stages linked to measurable progress on reforms, with greater institutional involvement and financial support.<\/p>\n

    In early 2026, under pressure from US-led \u2018peace diplomacy\u2019, this idea was taken a step further for Ukraine, with a view to its accession to the EU on 1 January 2027. This prompted Blockmans and Emerson \u2013 the architects of the staged accession plan \u2013 to propose a two-stage approach: first, grant Ukraine the initial status of a \u2018Nominated Member State\u2019 with extensive functional participation in EU policies and EU funding, but without full voting rights and without a commissioner; and, second, grant it full membership following the conclusion of accession negotiations, the accession treaty, and ratification.<\/p>\n

    In the case of \u2018associate\u2019 or \u2018political\u2019 membership, it is the basic idea rather than the specific terminology that is important, namely, to make membership politically binding without compromising the legal and institutional requirements for full membership.<\/p>\n

    Five factors should be taken into account when defining \u2018political membership\u2019:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    First<\/strong>, Ukraine and the EU, along with its Member States, are already benefiting from cooperation on security and defence policy<\/strong>. Kyiv should therefore participate regularly<\/em> in European foreign, security, and defence policy gatherings whenever issues related to its security, EU policy towards Russia, EU sanctions, defence industries, cyber defence, or military mobility are concerned. In this regard, the EU can and should de facto offer more than just observer status, such as a documented consultative vote without a right of veto, guaranteed speaking rights, joint situation assessments, and participation in procurement and defence programmes. In areas where the EU benefits from Ukraine\u2019s capabilities, Ukraine should play a role in shaping European policy. As part of the official accession process, Cluster 6 (together with the Fundamentals and Internal Market clusters) should be opened.<\/p>\n

    Second<\/strong>, the reconstruction process<\/strong> should be embedded in the \u2018political membership\u2019. The successor to the Ukraine Facility<\/a>, designed to run until the end of 2027, should be more than just a financial instrument supporting reconstruction and accession readiness. Building on experience to date, a European recovery and investment framework could bundle public funds, private investment, government investment guarantees, technical assistance, local capacities, and reforms. Priority should be given to areas that simultaneously strengthen security, economic strength, and accession readiness: energy, transport infrastructure, critical infrastructure, public administration, SMEs, mine clearance, digitalization, raw materials (including critical ones), and industrial modernization. It is not realistic to include Ukraine in the EU\u2019s 2027-2034 Multiyear Financial Framework (MFF); but the best possible foundations should be laid now for the 2035-2042 MFF.<\/p>\n

    Third<\/strong>, the EU should offer participation<\/strong> to Ukraine in areas where the latter can deliver rapid benefits. Building on roaming and SEPA payments, these should include: deeper energy integration, customs and transport streamlining, transport infrastructure, digital services, selected industrial chains, strategic raw materials, and research programmes. Future-oriented fields, in particular, should play a role. In contrast, agriculture and cohesion policy will require transition periods and frank discussions about the costs. Rather than being an argument against Ukrainian membership, this is one in favour of political realism.<\/p>\n

    Fourth<\/strong>, Ukraine would benefit from both regular visibility and institutional integration<\/strong> in addition to shouldering political responsibility. Observer status in the European Parliament and in Council gatherings is more than just a symbolic gesture. The EU should consistently apply the well-known and straightforward rule that no strategic policy on Ukraine should be formulated without Ukrainian involvement. In this way, these engagements would give Ukrainian politicians a first-hand understanding of priorities, procedures, and political scope within the EU.<\/p>\n

    Fifth<\/strong>, \u2018political membership\u2019 should focus on strengthening the rule of law<\/strong>. Bringing about lasting change in this area is Ukraine\u2019s Achilles\u2019 heel. However, the spread of Magdeburg Law as far as eastern Ukraine is also an important point of reference in the collective consciousness of Ukrainian society and a testament to its deep-rooted cultural ties with Europe. A \u2018rule of law and governance pact\u2019 would complement the EU\u2019s enlargement reports by allowing for flexibility and enabling swift feedback. While the EU system would continue to provide benchmarks and detailed progress reports, the pact would involve reform-oriented elements from Ukraine as well as international expert advice. It could help to counteract polarization within the reform landscape by bringing together anti-corruption stakeholders, the administration, the judiciary, parliament, civil society, and the professional community in a solution-oriented, joint reform process.<\/p>\n

    6. A roadmap for 2027 \u2013 How Germany can win over other EU Member States<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    By 2027, Ukraine should no longer be merely a candidate. Instead, it should have a voice in selected EU areas, play a visible role in key European policy fields, and be embedded in security and reconstruction structures \u2013 all while still being under clear pressure to reform. That would not be second-class membership. Rather, it would be the bridge out of the grey zone.<\/p>\n

    By the time of the European Council meeting in December 2026, Berlin should \u2013 together with a group of like-minded EU Member States \u2013 put forward a proposal that defines \u2018political membership\u2019 more clearly as a preliminary stage to full membership. In addition to Ukraine, this could also apply to Moldova at some point in the future \u2013 without sidelining the candidate countries in South-Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

    The proposal should not be presented as a German initiative, but rather as a European risk management approach in which Berlin will shoulder a crucial amount of joint responsibility. The challenge will be to incorporate the various concerns into a single proposal.<\/p>\n

    France is likely to ask, above all, whether enlargement without EU reform will undermine the Union\u2019s ability to act. This concern is justified, and Paris faces a presidential election in 2027. At the same time, it must also be acknowledged that too little has been achieved within the Union since President Macron spoke of Europe\u2019s \u2018conceptual and strategic awakening\u2019 to an audience of Central and Eastern Europeans in 2023. France could be won over by \u2018political membership\u2019 because it (once again) opens up a window of opportunity for institutional reforms without leaving Ukraine in political limbo.<\/p>\n

    In addition to costs, the Netherlands will likely be looking at the rule of law and the integrity of the Single Market. Berlin could introduce monitoring mechanisms and transitional rules, for which a Dutch-inspired approach appears promising. Under this approach, relevant national line ministries would systematically assess where Ukrainian integration creates opportunities, where alignment costs arise, and what risks are involved.<\/p>\n

    Poland and Romania are among the countries whose security would particularly benefit from Ukraine\u2019s membership in the EU. At the same time, they are the ones who feel the friction most acutely \u2013 with agriculture, transport, historical disputes, and border infrastructure. Economic plans could help to cushion the costs of adjustment. In addition to the reforms in cohesion policy, it is important not to lose sight of the economic benefits of enlargement and reconstruction.<\/p>\n

    For the Baltic and Nordic member states, the security argument carries the most weight. Berlin could cooperate with them within the framework of a security partnership. This coalition could serve as a prime example of the benefits of systematically integrating Ukraine into European defence planning, procurement, and cyber resilience.<\/p>\n

    The upcoming EU Council presidencies of Ireland, Lithuania, and Greece could also contribute to the success of such a \u2018political membership\u2019 \u2013 Ireland, with its positive story of transformation through EU membership; Lithuania, with its own enlargement and security experiences; and Greece, with its southern European perspective on connectivity and the Black Sea region.<\/p>\n

    Representing a special case are the obstructors who may come out of hiding now that the situation in Hungary has changed. Not every veto can be resolved through communication. Issues that pose genuine problems (e.g. budgetary ones) should be addressed. But when they are merely used as a pretext, the EU needs political pressure and creative approaches. The recent practice of pressing ahead with 26, 25, or 24 Member States shows that a desire for unanimity must not be allowed to become an invitation to thwart European interests.<\/p>\n

    By the end of 2026, the EU and all 27 Member States \u2013 regardless of any disagreements over specific chapters \u2013 should be technically prepared to politically activate Ukraine\u2019s \u2018political membership\u2019 while pushing ahead in parallel with the traditional accession negotiations.<\/p>\n

    7. Three priorities for resolving the conflict between speed and soundness<\/strong><\/h2>\n

    \u2018Political membership\u2019 would create a framework for an integration that has already been underway for some time now. In terms of security and economic policy, Ukraine is already part of Europe. The EU should not pass up this opportunity to swiftly put the necessary framework in place. For this to succeed, Germany\u2019s policies towards Ukraine and the EU should be based on three priorities:<\/p>\n

    First:<\/strong> Agree with Kyiv and within the EU on a political framework for belonging and develop, by the end of 2026, a roadmap for Ukraine\u2019s \u2018political membership\u2019 effective 1 January 2027. On the basis of the five elements outlined above for integrating security, reform, and reconstruction policies, the EU should frame Ukraine\u2019s accession as part of a pan-European risk management strategy and take into account the interests of other candidate countries. Berlin can work with Kyiv and a group of willing Member States to clarify the stages, rights, obligations, transitional clauses, and lines of communication. The window of opportunity following the Hungarian election and ahead of the \u2018super election year\u2019 of 2027 should be seized.<\/p>\n

    Second:<\/strong> Hold an intergovernmental conference with Ukraine as soon as possible and open at least the EU acquis clusters on \u2018Fundamentals\u2019, \u2018Internal Market\u2019, and \u2018External Relations\u2019. Full EU membership would remain conditional, subject to the established criteria, but the formal process should be advanced with 2035 as the target year for accession.<\/p>\n

    Third:<\/strong> Offer a confidential track 1.5 reform dialogue. At the same time, representatives from Ukraine and EU Member States could meet regularly in a confidential setting to address shortcomings in the implementation of the rule of law, the separation of powers, administrative reform, and the fight against corruption \u2013 with the goal being to make conditionality more politically effective, faster, and more practical.<\/p>\n

    This analysis builds on the following previous publications:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \u2022 EU-Beitritt im Eilverfahren \u2013 Sonderweg auf der Suche nach Frieden?<\/a> (Kosmehl 2026): On the frontloading initiative and the question of possible EU accession in 2027 in the context of peace negotiations.<\/p>\n

    \u2022 Charting Ukraine’s EU Path: Engaging with Member States<\/a>\u00a0(Kosmehl, Schlegel, Stewart 2026): On the significance of national dynamics within Member States, including agriculture, the rule of law, public support, veto risks, and tailored communication with France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Romania, Greece, and Ireland.<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u2022 Bridging Security and Political Governance in Ukraine-EU Relations: How to Calibrate European Integration and Security Cooperation<\/a> (Kazdobina et al. 2024): On Ukraine\u2019s integration into security and defence policy; on the significance of the EU acquis chapters on external relations as well as foreign, security, and defence policy; and on Ukraine\u2019s role in European deterrence.<\/p>\n

    \u2022 Multiple missions in the midst of war: Integrating Ukraine\u2019s recovery and EU accession<\/a> (Bergmann et al. 2024): On the links between reconstruction, the Ukraine Facility, the Ukraine Plan, and EU integration.<\/p>\n

    \u2022 Outlier or not? The Ukrainian economy\u2019s preparedness for EU accession<\/a> (Grieveson et al. 2023): On the issue of Ukraine\u2019s eligibility for accession, which \u2013 apart from the exceptional circumstances of the war \u2013 is not fundamentally different from the earlier accessions of Romania and Poland.<\/p>\n

    \u2022 Ukraine\u2019s economic reconstruction: Addressing territorial inequalities, consolidating regional policy and reaping the benefits of EU integration<\/a> (Kochnev et al. 2023): On territorial inequalities and issues relating to regional and local politics, in conjunction with the benefits of EU integration.<\/p>\n

    References and footnotes can be found in the PDF version of this policy brief.<\/em><\/p>\n

    About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Miriam Kosmehl is Senior Expert on Eastern Europe and EU Neighbourhood at the Bertelsmann Stiftung.<\/p>\n

    Christoph Michailow is an intern in the Bertelsmann Stiftung\u2019s Europe Program.<\/p>\n","excerpt":"

    How Berlin and Kyiv Can Guide Ukraine\u2019s Successful Accession to the EU Executive summary Ukraine is not a typical case […]<\/p>\n","thumbnail":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2026\/06\/AdobeStock_114788252.jpeg","thumbnailsquare":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2026\/06\/AdobeStock_114788252.jpeg","authors":[{"id":28565,"name":"Miriam Kosmehl","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/blogger\/miriam-kosmehl-ll-m\/"},{"id":40100,"name":"Christoph Martin Michailow","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/blogger\/christoph-martin-michailow\/"}],"categories":[{"id":597,"name":"Europe in the World","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/category\/europe-in-the-world\/"}],"tags":[{"id":202,"name":"eu","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/eu\/"},{"id":263,"name":"European Union","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/european-union\/"},{"id":151,"name":"Publications","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/publications\/"}]}