{"id":39599,"title":"Chancellor Merz in China \u2013 Resist Charm Offensive, Align with Four Guardrails","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/europe-in-the-world\/chancellor-merz-in-china-resist-charm-offensive-align-with-four-guardrails\/","date":"23. Februar 2026","date_unix":1771861437,"date_modified_unix":1772034729,"date_iso":"2026-02-23T15:43:57+00:00","content":"

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz\u2019s first official visit to China occurs at a pivotal geopolitical moment: transatlantic relations face strains and China promotes itself as a champion of \u201ctrue multilateralism\u201d<\/a>, as Wang Yi put it at the Munich Security conference.<\/p>\n

In this changing world order, where power trumps rules ever more, Berlin should strive for a stance on China that strengthens Europe\u2019s economic security and strategic resilience. What happens in Beijing will reverberate across the EU\u2019s China policy and Germany\u2019s role in shaping it. The Chancellor\u2019s visit to China therefore is a difficult task and expectations on both sides weigh heavily. It requires precise strategic consideration: dialogue with Beijing without political naivety; economic openness without security vulnerabilities; European unity without domestic political irritations. Merz should try to resist a potential Chinese charm offensive and align his visit with four guardrails:<\/p>\n

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  1. China\u2019s stance on Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine:<\/strong> This issue goes directly against Europe\u2019s core security interests. As a result, it is and will remain a structural burden for bilateral relations.<\/li>\n
  2. Economic security and de-risking are a priority: <\/strong>Export controls, e.g. on rare earths, weaponise dependencies and increase the vulnerability of European industry. De-risking is not protectionism, but a legitimate political goal \u2013 one China itself has pursued for years.<\/li>\n
  3. The trade imbalance<\/strong>\u00a0and China\u2019s underlying industrial policy<\/strong> are a long-term economic and security risk for Europe. The next Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) signals continuity with even more speed and ambition.<\/li>\n
  4. Diverging corporate and overall economic interests:<\/strong> Some large multinational corporations are expanding their investments in China \u2013 in some cases while simultaneously reducing capacity in Germany.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Standing firm on European and German core interests <\/strong><\/h2>\n

    China again was Germany\u2019s largest trade partner in 2025<\/a>, albeit with increasing imbalances in China\u2019s favour. But in times of rising tensions and differences, it remains vital to keep diplomatic channels of communication and exchange open \u2013 even if the message might be \u201cagreeing to disagree.\u201d<\/p>\n

    But the timing and sequencing of the Chancellor\u2019s visit to China still is telling. Merz has been in office for nearly one year and his first Asian visit was to India<\/a>. This shows that Germany is recalibrating its Indo-Pacific priorities according to the shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. De-risking and diversifying economic relations require global partnerships beyond the two great powers, China and the US.<\/p>\n

    Beijing will still try to exploit the deterioration of transatlantic relations during the Chancellor\u2019s visit to China. This means it is important for Friedrich Merz to resist a potential charm offensive. The core issues in the relations with China do not vanish into thin air just because of increasing US pressure on Europe.<\/p>\n

    These four guardrails should therefore guide the Chancellor\u2019s talks with Chinese interlocutors:<\/p>\n

    1. Address China\u2019s role in Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    This issue remains the most significant structural burden for bilateral relations. Although Beijing<\/a> presents itself as neutral \u2013 and occasionally signals interest in diplomatic solutions \u2013 it has refrained from condemning Russia\u2019s aggression and maintained close political and economic ties with Moscow.<\/p>\n

    China at least indirectly supports<\/a> Russia\u2019s war machine by buying Russian fossil fuels and supplying dual-use goods, such as advanced electronic and communication components. Without this, Russia would likely not have been able to continue this war for four years. Moreover, it is safe to assume that China will remain on Russia\u2019s side as long as it is in China\u2019s strategic interests. This goes blatantly against Europe\u2019s core security interests.<\/p>\n

    Chancellor Merz will not alter Beijing\u2019s strategic calculus vis-\u00e0-vis Moscow. But he should make it clear that bilateral relations with China will not be lifted to a \u201dnew level\u201d<\/a>, as recently proposed by Beijing, as long as the war is going on.<\/p>\n

    2. Emphasize economic security and de-risking:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    China\u2019s export restrictions on critical inputs, such as rare earths, are an economic security risk for Germany and the EU. The restrictions weaponise dependencies and increase the vulnerability of European industry. Chancellor Merz should therefore consistently signal to Chinese interlocutors that economic security and de-risking remain a priority for Germany and the EU.<\/p>\n

    Rather than merely appealing to China\u2019s goodwill, he could adopt a more strategic rhetorical approach. Chinese officials have repeatedly called<\/a> for the EU to enhance its \u201cstrategic autonomy.\u201d From a Chinese perspective, this implicitly means de-risking from the US, not from China.<\/p>\n

    The Chancellor could deliberately turn this argument around: Genuine strategic autonomy requires resilience, diversification and reduced exposure to external coercion. In that sense, the EU\u2019s de-risking agenda follows a logic long embedded in China\u2019s own economic policy, which has consistently sought to reduce critical dependencies and strengthen domestic capabilities.<\/p>\n

    By framing de-risking as a legitimate political goal \u2013 one China itself has pursued for years \u2013 the Chancellor can push back against potential accusations of protectionism. He could also make clear to the Chinese side: If China wants to be seen as a reliable partner, it does not impose export restrictions in critical sectors.<\/p>\n

    3. Voice concerns about trade imbalances:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    Germany\u2019s trade deficit with China widened significantly in 2025<\/a>. Exports fell by 9.7% while imports rose by 8.8%, resulting in a record deficit of \u20ac90 billion \u2013 around one-third higher than the previous year. Industrial overcapacity, state subsidies, an undervalued<\/a> Chinese currency, and the re-direction of Chinese exports as a result of the US-China trade conflict are increasing pressure on core European industries, such as automotive and machine tools, often referred to as China Shock 2.0<\/a>. China\u2019s next Five-Year Plan<\/a> signals continuity with even more speed and ambition, as Beijing prioritises technological self-reliance in strategic sectors \u2013 from semiconductors to AI \u2013 with the clear objective of reducing external dependencies and securing global leadership in future industries. China also aims to reinforce and upgrade its position in global value chains in traditional industries, including chemicals and mechanical engineering.<\/p>\n

    For Germany, whose economic model is deeply rooted in high-value manufacturing, this poses a structural risk. Chancellor Merz should voice these concerns emphatically, even if Beijing will not fundamentally change its industrial policy \u2013 regardless of the potential negative impact on other countries. Nevertheless, it is important that Chinese interlocutors hear this message in order to highlight the stark contrast to their ubiquitous win-win rhetoric. This is also an important message to the German public in order to raise awareness of the risks involved in economic relations with China.<\/p>\n

    4. Distinguish between corporate and overall economic interests:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    According to media reports<\/a>, the largest business delegation since Angela Merkel\u2019s first term will accompany the Chancellor to China. Among the 30 participants are DAX CEOs along with representatives of medium-sized and Mittelstand<\/em> companies, which typically have less leverage in shaping China-related policy. The delegation also comprises several companies from the machine tool sector \u2013 one of the industries most exposed to the China Shock.<\/p>\n

    For the Chancellor, this creates a balancing act. As German investment in China is highly concentrated<\/a> among a small number of large corporations, dependencies are distributed asymmetrically. More diversified medium-sized and Mittelstand<\/em> companies may depend less on China as a sales market. They may be more concerned with the effects of the China Shock on Germany, the EU and third markets. However, some large companies with substantial investment in China, depend heavily on the Chinese market. For some of them, de-risking even means doubling down on their investment in China \u2013 in some cases accompanied<\/a> by job cuts or reduced investment in Germany.<\/p>\n

    Corporate interests and the long-term interests of Germany or the EU as a business location therefore do not always align. While company representatives join the delegation to promote their commercial interests, the Chancellor\u2019s role is different. He represents the overall economic and strategic interests of Germany and the EU: resilience, fair competition and a strong domestic industrial base. These aspects \u2013 not individual companies\u2019 interests \u2013 should be the focus of his talks in China.<\/p>\n

    Chancellor Merz\u2019s visit to China will serve as an indicator of how Germany intends to navigate this complex and contested relationship. The message Berlin sends about priorities, limits and expectations will shape not only bilateral relations with Beijing, but Germany\u2019s role in the EU\u2019s China policy.<\/p>\n

    An abridged version of this text was first published by\u00a0<\/em>China.Table<\/em><\/a>\u00a0on February 22, 2026.<\/p>\n

    About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Cora Jungbluth is Senior Expert in the Europe\u2019s Future Programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Her research focus is on China, foreign direct investment and international trade, especially the role of emerging economies.<\/p>\n","excerpt":"

    German Chancellor Friedrich Merz\u2019s first official visit to China occurs at a pivotal geopolitical moment: transatlantic relations face strains and […]<\/p>\n","thumbnail":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2026\/02\/germany-china.jpeg","thumbnailsquare":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2026\/02\/germany-china.jpeg","authors":[{"id":2725,"name":"Cora Jungbluth","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/blogger\/dr-cora-jungbluth\/"}],"categories":[{"id":597,"name":"Europe in the World","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/category\/europe-in-the-world\/"}],"tags":[{"id":202,"name":"eu","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/eu\/"},{"id":263,"name":"European Union","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/european-union\/"}]}