Introduction<\/h2>\n
Space assets are now central to both economic performance (European Commission 2025b) and security and defence purposes (S\u00fc\u00df 2025). Yet Europe faces significant dependencies on the United States in this sector, including situation awareness in space, launch
\nservices, military space assets, satellite components and crewed spaceflight.<\/p>\n
Against the backdrop of a shifting transatlantic relationship and a more hostile security environment in Europe, strengthening Europe\u2019s existing space capabilities and industrial base has become a prerequisite for greater autonomy and strategic resilience. Paradoxical-
\nly, however, the sector\u2019s most dynamic and innovative developments are now emerging from the private sector \u2013 enabled by policies explicitly designed to promote commercialisation.<\/p>\n
Political Changes Meet Commercialisation Trends<\/h2>\n
The space sector is changing, and this change is mostly driven by two trends: First, the renewed importance of state institutional demand, primarily for security and defence purposes. Second, a changing space industrial ecosystem that could, in future, thrive on commercial demand \u2013 provided policy frameworks actively support this reconfiguration.<\/p>\n
Political Ambitions and Investments<\/h3>\n
Security concerns in Europe are intensifying, due to the threat of a militarily reconstituting Russia as well as the Trump administration\u2019s ambiguous space and alliance policies that lay bare space capability gaps in Europe\u2019s armed forces. Counteracting enduring dependency on U.S. space capabilities is no small feat (S\u00fc\u00df 2025), but Europe is beginning to respond.<\/p>\n
In line with the established division of labour across Europe\u2019s distributed space sector, national security and defence programmes are currently at the forefront of this activity. Poland, for example, is investing in Earth observation capabilities (Adamowski 2025; Gwadera 2025). Germany\u2019s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, has announced planned investments of \u20ac35 billion into defence-related space capabilities (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2025), while France has also increased planned investments (Desmarais
\n2025), to name but a few examples. Both France and Germany have recently published new space (security) strategies (Republique Francaise 2025; Die Bundesregierung, 2025).<\/p>\n
At the same time, activity is increasing at the multi- and supranational levels. The European Space Agency (ESA) has announced higher spending over the next three years, alongside more ambitious planning for this period (European Space Agency 2025a), while widening its mandate to include security and defence (Kayali 2025). In Brussels, meanwhile, the European Commission\u2019s draft Space Act is being debated intensively, with input from industry, member states and allied partners (European Commission 2025a). While these institutional actors continue to shape Europe\u2019s space ecosystem, a shift towards greater commercialisation is already under way (Johns Hopkins University 2025). If deployed effectively, rising state investment in Europe could be used to support and accelerate this transition.<\/p>\n
Commercialisation Trends<\/h3>\n
Commercial actors dominate media coverage and the broader news cycle about space \u2013 from the landing of reuseable rocket boosters (Tribou 2025) to private actors checking off milestone achievements such as spacewalks (Rannard 2024). This commercialisation of
\nthe space ecosystem is arguably the most significant overarching trend in the industry and is widely expected to bring about transformative change (Sch\u00fctz 2020).<\/p>\n
Fundamentally, though, commercialisation in space \u2028is nothing new. Certain segments \u2013 most notably\u2028 communications and satellite manufacturing \u2013 have\u2028 been commercialised for decades, with private commercial demand long outstripping institutional and \u2028state demand by a wide margin (e.g. Eurospace 2025).\u2028 Commercial launch companies, though all failing in\u2028their time, already existed as early as the 1970s (R\u00f6sing 2025) and into the 1990s (Heyman 2013). Three\u2028 of today\u2019s most prominent private launch companies,\u2028 SpaceX, Blue Origin and Rocket Lab, were all founded\u2028in the early 2000s (O\u2019Connor and Curlee 2025).<\/p>\n
To date, however, comprehensive commercialisation\u2028 encompassing the entire space sector \u2013 and fundamentally reshaping supply, demand and innovation\u2028 processes \u2013 has not occurred. State-led institutional\u2028 demand remains critical to the viability of the overall\u2028ecosystem (Veugelers et al. 2025). Where meaningful progress in commercialisation has taken place,\u2028\u00ad particularly in the United States, it has largely been \u2028driven by changes in NASA\u2019s procurement and \u2028contracting practices. Over the past 15 years, these have\u2028increasingly shifted towards a \u2018space as a service\u2019\u2028\u00ad model (Sch\u00fctz 2020).<\/p>\n
Through this shift, institutional actors no longer as\u2028sume responsibility for operating spacecraft once they\u2028 have been manufactured and delivered by private\u2028 firms. Instead, they purchase services \u2013 for example,\u2028 transporting cargo or astronauts to the International\u2028 Space Station (ISS) (NASA, n.d.-b). This model gives \u2028companies greater freedom in meeting the technological and financial requirements set by public clients and \u2028helps decouple programmes \u2013 traditionally shaped by\u2028 pork-barrel politics \u2013 from some of the distortions associated with highly politicised markets.<\/p>\n
Through the adoption of \u2018space as a service\u2019, state\u2028 actors aim to foster deep commercialisation of the \u2028space ecosystem by shifting investment, demand and \u2028innovation increasingly towards the private sector, as \u2028illustrated in Figure 1 (Roettgen 2024). In this model,\u2028 initial state demand creates the conditions for products and services to mature technologically, enabling\u2028 commercial applications that, in turn, generate further \u2028innovation and private-sector engagement.<\/p>\n
\u2018New space\u2019 \u2013 the colloquial umbrella term for emerging business models that may underpin this evolving \u2028commercial ecosystem \u2013 encompasses a wide range of\u2028 activities. These include established services such as\u2028 satellite data for Earth observation, as well as \u2028manufacturing processes in microgravity and more speculative \u2028applications, including asteroid mining (Grest 2020).<\/p>\n
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<\/p>\n
Notably, this predominantly U.S.-driven narrative of\u2028 commercial \u2018new space\u2019 has gained traction well beyond the United States, including in Europe. In \u2028pursuing commercialisation, many space actors therefore \u2028look to the U.S. experience as a model to emulate.<\/p>\n
Yet the developments observed in the United States\u2028 were enabled by a specific combination of national \u2028and cultural factors, including, first, a widespread perception of intense geopolitical competition with peer\u2028or near-peer rivals in a domain of high national security relevance; second, a corresponding level of demand \u2028from the U.S. national security apparatus \u2013 including\u2028 the armed forces and intelligence services \u2013 with a\u2028strong emphasis on technological superiority; third, a \u2028cultural preference for limiting the role of government\u2028 in delivering solutions to these challenges (Weiss\u20282014); and fourth, institutional and industrial experience \u2028drawn from other technology sectors, such as \u2028microchips, and applied to space (Sch\u00fctz 2020).<\/p>\n
Another core tenet of the U.S. approach to space commercialisation is assuring redundancy and a minimum \u2028of two suppliers for critical functions \u2013 from launch \u2028services to satellite manufacturing and human lunar \u2028landings (e.g. Mohon 2024). This principle is particularly important in a technologically demanding field such \u2028as space, where delays have affected almost every \u2028major programme, ranging from human spaceflight (Rou\u2028lette 2025) to the introduction of new launch vehicles.<\/p>\n
Conflicting Policy Goals<\/h2>\n
As Europe plans to increase space-related spending\u2028\u2013 raising annual expenditures by at least 50% over\u2028 the coming years compared with, for example, 2022 \u2028levels (see Ren\u010delj 2024) \u2013 and has largely embraced \u2028the U.S. narrative on space commercialisation, it is\u2028 better positioned to begin activating the flywheel of \u2028space commercialisation than it was only a few years \u2028ago. Yet a clear strategy for translating this narrative\u2028 into a concrete vision \u2013 one that balances competing \u2028policy objectives and reflects Europe\u2019s distinct\u2028 institutional and industrial context \u2013 remains absent. \u2028This gap is \u00ad becoming increasingly problematic given \u2028the compressed timelines associated with defence-driven capability requirements, which account for a\u2028substantial share of the planned increase in investment\u2028 over the coming years.<\/p>\n
Sovereignty versus Time<\/h3>\n
Security pressures are acute, and non-European \u2028industrial suppliers may be better positioned to deliver \u2028hardware and services at speed. Yet the systematic\u2028 build-up of industrial capabilities and capacities \u2028required to strengthen Europe\u2019s autonomy in space\u2028 inevitably takes time \u2013 regardless of the level of\u2028 funding being applied.<\/p>\n
By now, senior European politicians, military officials\u2028 and intelligence representatives have set out stark \u2028timelines regarding the threat posed by Russia in the\u2028 coming years. The late 2020s are widely viewed as a \u2028point at which Russia could be capable of attacking additional European countries beyond Ukraine. If Europe\u2028\u2013 as a limited space power (Aliberti 2023) \u2013 seeks to\u2028 enhance its military capabilities while simultaneously \u2028increasing defence sovereignty, it will require a broader portfolio of space assets. These span intelligence, \u2028surveillance and reconnaissance; positioning, navigation and timing; missile early warning and tracking; and\u2028 communications (S\u00fc\u00df 2025).<\/p>\n
If rising institutional demand \u2013 particularly in security\u2028 and defence \u2013 becomes the primary driver of Europe\u2019s\u2028 space ecosystem over the coming years, a clear dilemma emerges. Capabilities must be deployed rapidly to \u2028strengthen Europe\u2019s deterrence and defence posture,\u2028 yet domestic industrial capacity and capability may be \u2028insufficient to support an exclusively European procurement strategy. This creates incentives to contract\u2028 suppliers from outside Europe, notably the United \u2028States (Erwin 2025b). Even where European suppliers \u2028are available, traditionally risk-averse defence procurement agencies may favour established firms over new \u2028market entrants offering unproven technologies. In \u2028addition, long production lead times and pre-booked\u2028 launch slots require planning horizons of several years\u2028 (Daehnick et al. 2023).<\/p>\n
In the German context, for example, annual spending\u2028of roughly \u20ac5 billion would require industrial capacity \u2028to double or more (European Space Policy Institute\u2028 2025a), a scale-up that seems unrealistic despite industry assurances. This problem can be mitigated by\u2028directing as much investment as possible towards\u2028 European companies. Even so, multiple bottlenecks\u2028\u2013 ranging from physical infrastructure and workforce \u2028recruitment to skills development, production processes, supply chains and their synchronisation \u2013 limit the\u2028ease with which capacity can be expanded. Already,\u2028 large parts of Europe\u2019s space industry face significant\u2028 talent shortages, particularly in areas such as software\u2028 and data, electronics design and systems engineering \u2028(Copernicus 2025).\u2028 Additionally, Europe does not make optimal use of the \u2028talent it possesses. Barriers to sector entry, competition \u2028with other high-technology industries, and weak\u2028 development pathways for graduates and early-career\u2028professionals all constrain workforce growth (European Space Policy Institute 2025b). For certain segments\u2028 of the space ecosystem, this will continue to necessitate \u2028international procurement. Launch services,\u2028 in particular, stand out due to the limited number of\u2028 European launchers and constrained availability in the \u2028foreseeable future (Greenacre 2024) \u2013 even if European start-ups succeed in reaching orbit in the near \u2028term. Both transatlantic cooperation and partnerships \u2028with launch providers in like-minded countries such as \u2028Japan or New Zealand may offer partial relief.\u2028 Against this backdrop, clear and upfront communication is essential. Explicitly prioritising the rapid delivery\u2028 of equipment and services to European armed forces\u2028 and intelligence agencies over near-term capability-building can help prevent disillusionment within the \u2028space sector, which has traditionally operated on longer development timelines.<\/p>\n
Private-Sector Dynamism versus Regulatory
\nAmbition<\/h2>\n
There are different pathways towards greater Europe-\u2028an sovereignty and autonomy in space, yet no shared\u2028European consensus on which route to pursue. Germany \u2028and the ESA, for example, have placed increasing\u2028emphasis on nurturing a nascent start-up ecosystem\u2028through U.S.-style commercialisation approaches.\u2028France, by contrast, continues to prioritise established\u2028industrial actors and their proven capabilities. At the\u2028same time, the European Union is seeking to shape\u2028and regulate the sector in order to improve the safety and sustainability of space activities, while facing\u2028strong resistance from member states, industry and\u2028international partners concerned about perceived\u2028overregulation and regulatory overreach.<\/p>\n
European efforts to emulate U.S. commercialisation\u2028models are most visible in launch policy. At the national \u2028level, Germany\u2019s Microlauncher Competition,\u2028launched in 2020 (Burkhardt, n.d.) supported promising \u2028start-ups with the explicit aim of funding innovative\u2028concepts that could enable cheaper access to\u2028space (Mittelbach 2020). At the European level, ESA\u2019s\u2028Launch Challenge \u2013 established in 2023 and preceded by the Boost! Initiative (European Space Agency,\u2028n.d.) \u2013 marked an important milestone by selecting\u2028five start-ups to deliver indigenous launch systems for\u2028the small and medium launch market. In parallel, ESA\u2019s\u2028Flight Ticket Initiative, implemented in cooperation\u2028with the EU, places a strong emphasis on the role of\u2028public institutions as anchor customers for emerging\u2028launch providers (Parsonson 2025b).<\/p>\n
The stated objectives of these initiatives underline\u2028ESA\u2019s ambition to follow the U.S. model of launch\u2028commercialisation: fostering competition among European \u2028launch providers, promoting a diverse access-\u2028to-space ecosystem, supporting the development of\u2028innovative and cost-effective launch solutions, and\u2028enhancing Europe\u2019s autonomy in space transportation\u2028(European Space Agency 2025b). The selected companies and their launch vehicles are expected to achieve\u2028orbital launches by no later than 2027, with ESA missions planned between 2027 and 2030 and mission\u2028requirements set to expand over time (European Space\u2028Agency 2025b). In this respect, Europe\u2019s approach\u2028closely mirrors NASA\u2019s commercialisation strategy over\u2028the past 15 years (Sch\u00fctz 2020). At the heavy-lift end\u2028of the launch market, though, European competition\u2028remains distant. The Ariane 6 launcher is set to remain\u2028Europe\u2019s only heavy launch vehicle until start-ups accumulate \u2028sufficient technical experience and financial\u2028resources to enter this market segment.<\/p>\n
For satellites and other spacecraft, the EU Commis\u2028sion\u2019s Space Shield might offer an opportunity to\u2028strengthen non-traditional suppliers as the EU appears\u2028generally willing to use public procurement strategically to support the development of new space tech-\u2028nologies (Pesonen 2022). In this context, start-ups,\u2028micro- and mini-launcher firms, and other \u2018new space\u2019\u2028providers could benefit from institutional demand generated \u2028by Space Shield and related programmes.<\/p>\n
On the regulatory front, stakeholders broadly support\u2028the objectives of the European Commission\u2019s draft Space Act, particularly its focus on safety, sustainability and the functioning of the single market. At the\u2028same time, many warn that the draft\u2019s broad scope,\u2028legal ambiguities, compliance burden and potential\u2028discriminatory effects could raise costs, dampen\u2028innovation and fragment international cooperation\u2028(Bundesverband der Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie\u20282025). Additional reporting requirements, technical\u2028standards and insurance obligations could increase\u2028operational and compliance costs for commercial op-\u2028erators, especially small and medium-sized enterprises.\u2028Lengthier authorisation and assessment procedures\u2028risk slowing market entry and product development\u2028cycles, while new rules on debris mitigation, cybersecurity \u2028and data handling could require costly design or\u2028operational adjustments. For non-EU firms, the draft\u2019s\u2028expansive reach creates uncertainty over market access \u2028and may necessitate global compliance changes\u2028(Office of Space Commerce 2025). Overall, legal ambiguities \u2028in the proposal increase regulatory risk, com-\u2028plicating long-term planning for all commercial actors.\u2028This stands in contrast to the U.S.-led Artemis Accords,\u2028which 27 European states \u2013 from Iceland to Ukraine\u2028and from Finland to Spain \u2013 have joined. The Accords\u2028seek to establish principles governing the exploration\u2028and use of outer space, particularly in the inner solar\u2028system, with a comparatively commercial-friendly orientation \u2028(NASA, n.d.-a).<\/p>\n
Ecosystem Configuration versus Investment
\nPreferences<\/h2>\n
Europe currently finds itself between two stages: an \u2028initial phase of increased state-led investment and\u2028 state-funded technological development, and the emergence of new business models capable of attracting private capital and talent. If state-led investments over the\u2028coming years deliver sufficient technological progress,\u2028 some of today\u2019s unfavourable trends could be reversed.\u2028 At present, however, demand signals point in the opposite direction. While overall sales in the European space \u2028industry have stagnated at around \u20ac8.5 billion over the \u2028past decade, the commercial share of those revenues\u2028\u2013 including exports \u2013 has declined. Institutional demand \u2028has therefore grown in relative importance, with \u2028commercial sales accounting for only around a quarter \u2028of total revenues in 2024 (Eurospace 2025). In the early 2010s, sales were still split almost evenly between \u2028commercial and institutional customers.<\/p>\n
This shift largely reflects structural changes in the\u2028 market. Europe\u2019s traditional industrial strengths \u2013\u2028namely highly complex, high-quality large satellites for\u2028 geostationary orbit \u2013 have lost relevance as communications traffic has become increasingly digital and as\u2028satellite constellations and associated capabilities have\u2028 proliferated in low Earth orbit (European Space Policy\u2028Institute 2025). With security- and defence-related \u2028demand now taking the lead (Erwin 2025a), and with \u2028continued improvements in the technical performance\u2028 of smaller satellites \u2013 alongside their greater resilience\u2028 when deployed in constellations rather than as single\u2028 platforms \u2013 these trends are likely to intensify further\u2028 in the coming years. State demand should therefore \u2028incentivise incumbent firms to redirect internal development efforts, both in terms of space assets towards\u2028 smaller satellites and, more importantly, in production\u2028 processes away from bespoke manufacturing and towards mass production. At the same time, established\u2028 commercial success for launch services from Ariane-\u2028space suffered from delays in the introduction of the\u2028 Ariane 6 launcher, losing market share to SpaceX in\u2028 particular (Triezenberg et al. 2024).<\/p>\n
Additionally, most European space companies continue to generate a substantial share of their revenues \u2028within Europe and from European customers (Euro-\u2028space 2025). Relying on exports as a solution is thus\u2028 not tenable. At the same time, the emergence of new\u2028suppliers increases global competition across the value \u2028chain. Institutional demand will thus need to strike \u2028a careful balance between reinforcing the tradition\u2028al strengths of established suppliers and supporting \u2028emerging firms with technological potential that is \u2028better aligned with prevailing economic trends in the \u2028space sector.<\/p>\n
This challenge feeds directly into the broader question \u2028of whether a genuinely commercial European space\u2028 industry is viable, and it underscores the need for \u2028targeted policy interventions to steer the ecosystem\u2028 in that direction. Even in the United States \u2013 where\u2028national security demand is far greater than in Europe,\u2028 and where SpaceX has captured large portions of the \u2028globally contestable heavy-launch market \u2013 questions\u2028 persist over whether demand is sufficient to sustain \u2028more than one heavy-launch provider, or whether\u2028substantial internal demand, such as SpaceX\u2019s Starlink\u2028 programme, is a prerequisite for commercial viability\u2028 (Triezenberg et al. 2024). While European small and \u2028medium launch providers may initially carve out niches by supplying launch services to European armed\u2028forces, entry into the global heavy-launch market will\u2028 face significantly higher barriers. A similar adjustment \u2028challenge confronts Europe\u2019s satellite manufacturers,\u2028 as demand increasingly shifts towards low Earth orbit \u2028constellations.<\/p>\n
Consequently, purely competition-driven, open-market policy approaches are unlikely, for the time being,\u2028 to deliver the degree of commercialisation European\u2028 governments are seeking. To avoid monopolistic out\u2028comes with price-setting power, Europe should consider adopting the U.S. approach of maintaining and \u2028supporting a minimum of two suppliers in critical segments, even where this entails higher per-unit costs,\u2028 particularly for launch services. In other areas of the\u2028 space industry, the risk may be less acute, although\u2028further consolidation among large legacy players could \u2028nonetheless prove problematic in this regard (Parson-\u2028son 2025a).<\/p>\n
Finally, the United States shows little sign of revising \u2028its approach to space commercialisation and is likely\u2028 to continue leveraging its first-mover advantage (The\u2028White House 2025). In fact, with a greater focus on \u2028China as a geopolitical competitor in space (Nelson et\u2028al. 2025), rising defence-related space spending \u2013 in\u2028cluding for the U.S. Space Force and programmes such \u2028as Golden Dome (Bowen 2025) \u2013 and the continued\u2028 maturation of private space firms (Swope 2025), transatlantic competition in the space domain will intensify.<\/p>\n
A European Way Forward<\/h2>\n
Commercialisation holds the promise of transformative \u2028change in the space sector. With rising levels of investment, Europe can now begin activating this dynamic in \u2028earnest. Simply replicating the U.S. approach, however, \u2028is unlikely to succeed \u2013 both for economic and political \u2028reasons. Europe will therefore need to chart a similar,\u2028 but adapted, path. Three steps are particularly important:<\/p>\n
- \n
- Given the favourable funding environment and\u2028 outlook, European states should pursue a dual-track approach in which national or European \u2028solutions are developed in parallel with the procurement of launches, equipment and services\u2028 from non-European suppliers. Compared with other areas of defence spending, overall expenditure\u2028 in the space domain remains relatively modest,\u2028 making such a dual-sourcing strategy feasible. This \u2028approach can help reconcile urgent time pressures\u2028 with the longer-term development of domestic\u2028 capabilities, even if initial investments fall short of\u2028 the scale desired by European industrial players.\u2028 For ESA and the EU, which already place a stronger\u2028 emphasis on European procurement\u2014for \u2028example through ESA\u2019s work-share arrangements\u2014this\u2028 tension is less pronounced. Nonetheless, ESA\u2019s\u2028work-share system could benefit from reform,\u2028 shifting towards a model that balances industrial\u2028 shares across its expanding portfolio of projects \u2028rather than within individual projects, akin to the\u2028Organisation Conjointe de Coop\u00e9ration en Mati\u00e8re\u2028d\u2019Armement\u2019s (OCCAR) global share concept (OC-\u2028CAR, n.d.).<\/li>\n
- Commercialisation is Europe\u2019s most promising \u2028route to expanding its space ecosystem (Veugelers\u2028et al. 2025), a view broadly shared by the European Commission (European Commission 2025b).\u2028 The U.S. practice of soliciting private-sector\u2028 solutions through challenge-based procurement\u2028\u2013 most visibly through ESA\u2019s Launcher Challenge\u2028\u2013 has demonstrated its relevance in the European \u2028context as well, given Europe\u2019s strong aerospace \u2028talent base and maturing start-up ecosystem.\u2028 While the current lack of challenges beyond \u2028launch services and low Earth orbit cargo transport may appear unambitious, it reflects a focus on \u2028those industry segments with the greatest commercial potential at present. These include both \u2028legacy demand for launch and emerging activities\u2028 such as microgravity manufacturing, where related\u2028 Earth-based industries are long-standing \u2028European strengths. Member states, and the European\u2028 Commission in particular, should therefore concentrate regulatory efforts on enabling these \u2028activities, while steering institutional demand \u00ad towards\u2028 greater openness and a higher tolerance for risk\u2028\u00ad (Veugelers et al. 2025).<\/li>\n
- Nurturing Europe\u2019s space ecosystem will require \u2028a deliberate commitment to \u2018buy European\u2019 wher\u2028ever feasible. Without such an approach, the \u2028first-mover advantages already secured by U.S.\u2028firms \u2013 particularly in launch and reinforced by the maturation of additional launch systems in the \u2028coming years \u2013 risk undermining long-term \u2028industrial security and planning certainty in Europe. At\u2028 the same time, both the European Commission\u2028 and member states will need to articulate a clearer\u2028 vision for the sector, one that reconciles Europe\u2019s\u2028 limited market size with a realistically scaled competitive landscape. This is likely to entail consolidation or the exit of some firms (Veugelers et al.\u20282025) and will need to be more specific than the \u2028Commission\u2019s current broad strategic framework\u2028 (European Commission 2025c). At the same time,\u2028 retaining innovative companies in Europe will also \u2028require sustained access to both public and private \u2028capital. For the EU, this could take the form of government-sponsored venture capital (GVC) within \u2028a Strategic Space Fund, as recommended by the\u2028 European Space Policy Institute (European Space\u2028 Policy Institute 2025a). The financial commitment \u2028for such a GVC can be modest: even In-Q-Tel, the\u2028 well-known CIA-backed government venture capital vehicle, which invests across four areas \u2013 space,\u2028 energy, microchips and biotechnology \u2013 deploys\u2028 only around \u20ac100\u2013150 million annually (ProPubli-\u2028ca, n.d.). ESA, particularly in light of its expanded \u2028remit to include resilience, could oversee such a\u2028 fund as a non-profit entity. Its three-year budget\u2028 cycles would offer both investment stability and\u2028 sufficient time for portfolio companies to deliver\u2028 initial results, while ministerial meetings could be \u2028used to define overarching investment priorities.\u2028 This would allow for a more direct investment \u2028control and direction than current instruments like\u2028 CASSINI (European Commission, n.d.).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
Sources can be found in the PDF version.<\/p>\n
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