{"id":38982,"title":"One Year After Niinist\u00f6: Why the EU\u2019s Preparedness Strategy Cannot Be Wasted","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/security-policy\/one-year-after-niinisto-why-the-eus-preparedness-strategy-cannot-be-wasted\/","date":"29. Oktober 2025","date_unix":1761748988,"date_modified_unix":1761748988,"date_iso":"2025-10-29T14:43:08+00:00","content":"

Since the Niinist\u00f6 report was released a year ago, \u201cpreparedness\u201d has become Brussels\u2019 latest buzzword \u2013 and for good reason. Europe urgently needs the capacity to absorb shocks, maintain essential systems and defend itself against external threats. Yet initial enthusiasm has been tempered by the scale of the challenge.<\/em><\/p>\n

Preparedness spans all sectors of government and society, cutting across national and EU competences. Unless the EU defines where it can add tangible value \u2013 complementing NATO\u2019s resilience agenda, filling European gaps and equipping member states with practical tools \u2013 the Preparedness Union risks fading before it even begins.<\/em><\/p>\n

The good<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Amid Europe\u2019s new era of insecurity, preparedness has finally entered the European Union\u2019s policy orbit, driven by a group of member states<\/a> and reinforced by hard lessons from Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic.<\/p>\n

The October 2024 Niinist\u00f6 report<\/a> provided the intellectual foundation, framing preparedness as a necessary mindset shift \u2013 and it appeared to succeed. Just months later, in March 2025, the European Commission unveiled the European Preparedness Union Strategy<\/a>, described by some as part of a new \u201choly trinity\u201d alongside the Internal Security Strategy<\/a> and the Defence White Paper<\/a>. Adopting an all-hazards approach inspired by the Nordic model, it acknowledges Europe\u2019s diverse risk landscape across member states and lays the groundwork for broad support.<\/p>\n

Sixty-three actions<\/a> are at the heart of the strategy, forming the EU\u2019s first comprehensive preparedness agenda, signalling to partners, such as NATO, where it intends to contribute. Together, these measures bridge the outdated divide between internal and external security, reflect the reality of grey-zone threats, and emphasises public-private cooperation and external partnerships, which are two areas where NATO places great hope in the EU.<\/p>\n

By taking these measures, the Commission has made a significant step toward translating the often-cited \u201ccomprehensive approach to security\u201d into a concrete programme of crisis preparedness, moving further than several member states themselves in some respects.<\/p>\n

The bad<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Despite this progress, the Preparedness Union faces structural challenges. It attempts to transplant the Nordic model of whole-of-society preparedness into a union of 27 diverse states and a multi-level-governance system. But what works in a homogeneous state with a deep-rooted preparedness culture does not easily scale at EU level.<\/p>\n

By definition, preparedness is broad, spanning all hazards, whole governments and entire societies. Applied to the EU, this breadth easily turns into over-complexity. Agendas overlap, priorities blur, and member states hesitate to engage. The Preparedness Union illustrates this challenge well. Its remit cuts across existing initiatives \u2013 from internal security and defence to health policy, the Democracy Shield<\/a> and EU-NATO cooperation \u2013 yet responsibility sits with DG ECHO, a directorate more accustomed to civil protection than strategic projects.<\/p>\n

Rather than providing clear direction, the sixty-three actions resemble an old-fashioned department store, covering everything but lacking focus. This risks overwhelming the European Commission and member states, many of which have little tradition of preparedness and struggle to see tangible added value. For national governments already developing their own plans, the Commission\u2019s long list of actions might seem detached from realities on the ground.<\/p>\n

The result is a risk of European preparedness turning into a Brussels box-ticking exercise rather than a driver of resilience. Without a clearer focus and visible results, the strategy could collapse under its own weight before it has tangible impact.<\/p>\n

The way forward<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Europe doesn\u2019t need another grand plan. It needs action. If the European Commission aims to contribute meaningfully to Europe\u2019s resilience, it needs to carve out a niche grounded in member states\u2019 realities, while asking important questions: What do those actors responsible for preparedness need? How might concerted endeavours be facilitated? Where are NATO\u2019s blind spots? How can non-NATO EU members be included? The answers should drive actionable solutions that governments can use immediately.<\/p>\n

Three priorities stand out:<\/p>\n