In light of a fundamentally changing security landscape, Germany has a special obligation to contribute to Europe’s resilience and preparedness. But it is not fully equipped to meet this expectation. To help shape a comprehensively prepared Europe \u2013 and to credibly assume the leadership role its European partners increasingly expect \u2013 Germany must first implement a security concept that truly integrates society as a whole.<\/p>\n
For this to succeed, Germany should strengthen open risk communication, involve citizens as co-producers of security and improve structured coordination and cooperation between all societal actors and government institutions.<\/p>\n
Europe\u2019s longstanding foundations of peace and stability are under pressure. Russia\u2019s war of aggression, hybrid threats and systemic shocks \u2013 from pandemics to blackouts<\/a> and climate-related disasters \u2013 expose deep vulnerabilities across European societies. These risks are compounded by structural trends, such as critical infrastructure privatisation, accelerating digitalisation and growing global interdependence. All these factors strain traditional state capacities.<\/p>\n To be more defensible externally, more secure internally and better prepared across the board, Europe can no longer limit security to military strength or state authority. Security requires the mobilisation of entire societies, a principle already embedded in Nordic and Baltic strategic cultures<\/a> and now echoed in the EU\u2019s Preparedness Union Strategy<\/a>.<\/p>\n While building on existing tools and mechanisms, the strategy marks a shift in the way preparedness is framed and prioritised. It brings together EU action under a coherent framework, anchoring it in three guiding principles: all-hazards, whole-of-government and whole-of-society.<\/p>\n This framework provides an opportunity for convergence towards a shared societal vision of resilience across member states to lay the foundations for Europe’s goal of comprehensive security.<\/p>\n Germany is well positioned to lead Europe\u2019s preparedness agenda. Located at the heart of the continent, Germany is a NATO transit and deployment hub, as well as a frequent target of hybrid threats<\/a>. This generates a direct interest in advancing concerted European approaches to crisis and disaster preparedness.<\/p>\n The EU\u2019s Preparedness Union Strategy<\/a> offers Germany a pivotal opportunity to help shape Europe\u2019s collective resilience. However, to lead credibly abroad, Germany must first reorganise its national security structures in line with the whole-of-society principle. This will establish a foundation of comprehensive security and preparedness for the EU and frontrunner states, such as Finland, as well as Germany’s own integrated security approach<\/a>.<\/p>\n Conceptually, Germany has already laid important groundwork. The National Security Strategy (2023)<\/a>, the Resilience Strategy (2022)<\/a> and the recently updated Framework Guidelines for Total Defence (2024)<\/a> all reflect a shift toward integrated security. Now, the challenge is implementation.<\/p>\n This analysis assesses the country\u2019s readiness across three dimensions: security culture, societal engagement and institutional structures.<\/p>\n Despite a shift in rhetoric since Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany lacks a broad, shared understanding of security as a whole-of-society task.<\/p>\n The 2023 National Security Strategy<\/a> reframes security as a collective responsibility under the concept of integrated security. This calls for civic engagement in areas such as disinformation resilience, democratic integrity and supply chain protection. Public sentiment reflects this potential. A 2024 survey<\/a> found that 71% of all respondents were willing to engage in civil protection, with 80% support among younger citizens aged 16 to 29. Still, this civic energy remains underutilised.<\/p>\n What\u2019s missing is a risk culture that promotes open communication, shared responsibility and critical preparedness skills. Although threats<\/a>, such as war and sabotage, have reentered public debate, hybrid threats are often under-communicated and poorly understood. Public messaging rarely addresses the limits of state protection or clarifies individual and community-level responsibilities.<\/p>\n The fact that terms such as ‚war readiness<\/a>‚ are now being used in political debates marks a shift. But such language remains abstract without the deeper integration of preparedness and resilience measures into education, civic life and everyday practices. Furthermore, the coalition agreement<\/a> contains no structured plan to incorporate citizens into civilian defence or resilience-building initiatives.<\/p>\n Without systematic risk communication and a clearly defined civic role, Germany\u2019s integrated security strategy risks remaining a top-down concept, disconnected from everyday societal realities. Sweden\u2019s In case of crisis or war brochure<\/a> offers a best-practice example of how to inform, empower and involve the public in a meaningful way.<\/p>\n This gap in security culture is particularly evident when considering how the public is \u2013 or isn\u2019t \u2013 involved in practice. To deliver whole-of-society security, citizens need to be actively involved as co-producers of preparedness and resilience.<\/p>\n Germany\u2019s extensive volunteer base \u2013 spanning organisations including the German Red Cross, municipal fire brigades and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief \u2013 demonstrates strong civic commitment. Roughly 1.7 million volunteers<\/a> support the country\u2019s civil protection systems. Yet this vital resource is under increasing pressure because of demographic shifts, structural challenges and ongoing recruitment shortages.<\/p>\n Since the suspension of compulsory military and civil service in 2011, societal detachment from defence-related issues has grown. The absence of broad-based, structured involvement has contributed to a declining public connection<\/a> with the responsibilities and realities of national defence.<\/p>\n Ongoing debates<\/a> about reintroducing compulsory service highlight not only concerns over military personnel shortages, but a broader desire to reconnect society with defence. They point to interest in a more modern model<\/a>. In this vision, service goes beyond military roles to include a range of societal tasks, embedding defence and resilience more firmly within the fabric of society.<\/p>\n Reintroducing the old system seems rather likely within the next legislative term. But changing it into a more inclusive model that covers military and civilian tasks, or expanding it to include women, would require constitutional changes that remain politically sensitive<\/a>.<\/p>\n Alternative ideas are on the table. The German Red Cross has proposed a legal entitlement to voluntary service<\/a> supported by public funding. This model would provide host institutions with greater planning security and reduce entry barriers for participants, creating a viable route to broader civic engagement.<\/p>\n The public appears ready, with surveys<\/a> suggesting widespread willingness to contribute. However, without a modern, structured framework for engagement, Germany risks leaving this potential untapped.<\/p>\n The need for stronger civic participation and engagement underscores the importance of institutional readiness. But this is where Germany\u2019s structural challenges are most visible.<\/p>\n The country\u2019s federal structure<\/a> poses a major challenge. Civil defence in wartime is a federal responsibility. And in peacetime, disaster protection falls to the L\u00e4nder<\/em>, with many critical infrastructures controlled at the municipal level. In an era defined by hybrid threats and the growing need to strengthen deterrence through preparedness, this division of authority fuels disputes over accountability and funding. Responsibilities become blurred and Germany\u2019s ability to respond swiftly and effectively in times of crisis is undermined.<\/p>\n This structural complexity is exacerbated by siloed departmental operations and poor coordination, particularly with civil and private actors. As the distinction between internal and external security becomes blurred, existing mechanisms provide limited reliable channels for public-private cooperation<\/a>.<\/p>\n Dialogue, information exchange and joint action are inconsistent \u2013 and often hindered by bureaucracy. Although the need for stronger collaboration is widely recognised, interface management with the private sector remains underdeveloped. Reporting procedures are fragmented and companies often lack a single, consistent point of contact with security authorities.<\/p>\nGermany\u2019s role: Strategic, central \u2013 and still incomplete<\/strong><\/h2>\n
1. Security culture: No shared understanding yet<\/strong><\/h3>\n
2. Societal engagement: Strong potential, weak structure<\/strong><\/h3>\n
3. Institutional readiness: Still fragmented and underdeveloped<\/strong><\/h3>\n