{"id":34798,"title":"Connectivity Politics in a Time of Strategic Power Rivalries","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/europe-in-the-world\/connectivity-politics-in-a-time-of-strategic-power-rivalries\/","date":"31. Januar 2025","date_unix":1738321065,"date_modified_unix":1747995418,"date_iso":"2025-01-31T10:57:45+00:00","content":"

Cross-border connectivity means lifelines \u2013 and risks. Historically, whenever great powers have had overlapping spheres of influence, there is almost always conflict. The nations of the South Caucasus \u2013 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia \u2013 and Central Asia \u2013 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan \u2013 share a geopolitical reality between the EU, Russia and China, as well as rising regional powers. Together, they form a pivotal region for Global Gateway, the EU strategy aimed to unlock the benefits of connectivity. But different understandings of interconnectedness show the limits of \u201cconnectivity\u201d as a concept.<\/em><\/p>\n

Although trade does not necessarily bring political change, economic cooperation remains an important building block not only for asserting interests and gaining influence, but also for facilitating mutually beneficial exchange and fostering stability and peace. In the South Caucasus and Central Asia (SCCA), four main integration projects overlap \u2013 the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).<\/p>\n

\"SCCA<\/a>
This infographic examines SCCA nations\u2019 relations with the major actors active in their region.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Driven by very different motives, they impact how countries shape inter-state relations. All have a trade component. In times of revived power competition over nothing less than the liberal world order and critical natural resources, it is therefore just as crucial to assess the scope for EU South Caucasus and Central Asia economic cooperation as it is to anticipate conflicts.<\/p>\n

Addressing global challenges through new EU-SCCA dynamics<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Putin\u2019s full-fledged war against Ukraine has revealed Russia\u2019s readiness to unleash violent disorder. China remains ambiguous in its actions and intentions. And T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s transactional behaviour is disturbingly unpredictable. Amid these dynamics, ambitious leaders of regional powers like Iran and India, but also from rising nations like Azerbaijan, are seeking their own advantage.<\/p>\n

In December 2021, shortly before Russia started its full-scale war against Ukraine, the European Commission launched Global Gateway. The initiative is largely seen as a response to China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Global Gateway\u2019s primary goals are to enhance international connectivity through investments in infrastructure, digital technology, the energy sector and sustainable development. By facilitating trade, promoting economic growth and strengthening diplomatic ties, Global Gateway aims to solidify the EU\u2019s status as a key global actor.<\/p>\n

Baselines for SCCA relations with the EU, Russia, China and T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Some see in „network politics“ \u2013 or so-called connectography<\/a> \u2013 above all the chance to benefit from the complexities of connectedness and a diffusion of power. Others argue that Russia and China \u2013 together considered \u201cEurasia\u2019s authoritarian heartland\u201d<\/a> \u2013 will challenge rules- and value-based cooperation more profoundly than in the past.<\/p>\n

The authors of the infographic<\/a> examined SCCA nations\u2019 relations with the major actors active in their region, initially comparing levels of trade and investment, based on data from 2021 and 2022.<\/p>\n

SCCA holds strategic significance, not least because of its abundance of critical raw materials. But the EU is a sought-after trading partner beyond energy-centric relations, particularly as an exporter of chemical products, machinery and manufactured goods for the geographically closer SC countries and, to a lesser extent, the CA nations.<\/p>\n

Conversely, China is the CA nations\u2019 main trading partner. From Beijing\u2019s perspective, CA is not only a trade corridor to European markets, but a crucial source of raw materials essential for its economy. Another important Chinese objective is to open local sales markets for its own products.<\/p>\n

Trade patterns with Russia differ significantly. Russia exports more oil and gas to SCCA than it imports, yet trade with SCCA is still relatively balanced across different sectors. This reflects Russia\u2019s long-standing economic ties with the region, which benefit Russian efforts to circumvent sanctions imposed on it in response to its attack on Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Dramatic shifts in the export of key goods could already be observed when comparing 2021 to 2022. Armenia<\/a> is just one case in point: Mainly exporting tobacco, alcohol and agricultural products to Russia until 2021, its trade with Russia tripled in 2022 because it could supply sanctioned technology and machinery.<\/p>\n

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