{"id":34430,"title":"Danger Looms: The Future of EU-US Relations","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/europe-in-the-world\/danger-looms-future-eu-us\/","date":"13. Mai 2024","date_unix":1715619713,"date_modified_unix":1747996703,"date_iso":"2024-05-13T17:01:53+00:00","content":"

Translated from German by Dr. Br\u00edan Hanrahan <\/em><\/p>\n

Europe will see elections to the European Parliament in June, while the United States goes to the polls in November. Brussels would be advised to keep a close eye on events in Washington and make plans for a president who could again shun European allies.<\/em><\/p>\n

The Americans aren\u2019t interested, at least not the Republicans. Since early this year, worried European delegations have been making their way to Washington. Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg spoke at the Heritage Foundation think tank in January, heaping praise on NATO\u2019s \u201cEuropean pillar,\u201d above all the accession of Finland and Sweden. But his conservative American audience seemed indifferent.<\/p>\n

The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed similar themes in a speech given at the German embassy during his Washington visit, but his appeal also seemed to fall flat. In February, just three Republicans met with the visiting chairs of the Nordic parliamentary foreign affairs committees, although the Lithuanian representative\u2019s message was loud and clear: \u201cIf you want to avoid a second Pearl Harbor, you have to listen to us.\u201d<\/p>\n

Why should American taxpayers continue to pay for Europeans\u2019 shortcomings, asked JD Vance at the recent Munich Security Conference<\/a>? Writing in the Financial Times, the US senator from Ohio expanded his criticism: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk had claimed on Twitter that Americans should be ashamed, he noted, but in fact Europeans should be feeling that way, he suggested.<\/p>\n

During his visit to the United States, Chancellor Scholz addressed Republican voters directly via the pages of the Wall Street Journal, a newspaper now critical of the former president. But the move failed to pay off: 48 percent of Republicans and an increasingly large number of independents, a decisive group for November\u2019s elections, think US aid to Ukraine is too high or worse, see it as an unequal \u201ctax\u201d on Americans. And those numbers are rising.<\/p>\n

In February, just 22 Senate Republicans supported an aid package for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, a group the media promptly labelled \u201cdissenters.\u201d No one „dared“ to go against Donald Trump who recently campaigned on the idea that Russia could attack and \u201cdo whatever the hell they want\u201d to any NATO state which \u201cdidn\u2019t pay their bills.\u201d<\/p>\n

Even if Congress approves US aid this spring, these will be \u201cas long as we can\u201d funds \u2013\u00a0in other words, a short-term fix, no matter who is sitting in the White House in January 2025. Even if President Joe Biden manages to clinch re-election, he will not have large Democrat majorities in either the House or the Senate. In any case, American voters\u2019 support for Ukraine seems to be dwindling.<\/p>\n

Everything on the Table<\/h2>\n

If Europeans want to see a Ukrainian breakthrough against Russia before the end of 2024, they must take immediate responsibility for it themselves. European leaders will have to look beyond even \u201cwar readiness\u201d and begin the transition to Europe\u2019s own version of a war economy. Russia has already done just that, and is now hitting GDP growth of over 3 percent, not least because of its sanctions-busting measures.<\/p>\n

Russian growth is forecast to remain stable in 2024, while Germany has predicted annual growth of just 0.2 percent. In this European election year, a new honesty is required. Hard decisions will have to be taken to boost Europe\u2019s defensive capability and the resilience of its economy.<\/p>\n

As Europeans, we have to reconsider the flexibility of public finances: Everything must be on the table, including tax increases, spending limits, increased innovation spending and the sharing of the debt burden. Europe well understands where its own interests lie: It means simultaneously preparing for two separate geo-economic and geopolitical poles of uncertainty.<\/p>\n

The first pole is comprised of the \u201cauthoritarian coalition\u201d: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, who between them are continuing to fuel conflict in Ukraine, the Middle East, Sudan, and elsewhere in Africa. But the second pole of uncertainty is the United States, now a volatile power, whose democratic stability will be at stake in November\u2019s presidential elections.<\/p>\n

The European Union, and European member states in NATO, must act in coordination, finding new financial, institutional, and diplomatic energy. If they do not, the EU could become an increasingly irrelevant single market, with President Trump sending NATO into sleep mode.<\/p>\n

Seriously but not Literally<\/h2>\n

During Donald Trump\u2019s first term in office, Europeans were told they should take him seriously but not literally. The advice seems to have been correct, for the most part: Nothing came of threatened troop withdrawals from Europe, while the planned withdrawal from NATO was blocked by a new Congressional rule requiring a two-thirds majority.<\/p>\n

The EU took the trade war just as seriously as the Americans: value and jobs were destroyed on both sides. The Trump administration even expanded programmes like the European Deterrence Initiative, an American military programme launched in 2014, and the Countering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (2017), both of which were put to use after Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n

During Trump\u2019s presidency, Europe aimed to contain Washington\u2019s irrationalities and, as much as possible, offer immediate responses to attacks in trade and security policy. Exhausted by pandemic management, economic rescue, rising inflation, and later the war and energy crises, Europe had little time or energy to reposition itself either structurally or in terms of actual politics. Another factor was the growing fear of voters, who were not trusted to cope with the complexity of the crises. This position implicitly accepted the growing strength of populist parties.<\/p>\n

Despite differences of opinion on questions like Afghanistan, the Biden presidency has been far more amenable to Europe. But by the time the Democrat moved into the White House, Europeans had been worn down by the constant wrestling with the Trump administration and exhausted by the cascading effects of polycrisis.<\/p>\n

New strategies were developed \u2013 on China<\/a>, economic security, the European defence industry \u2013 and broad legislative packages were put together on technology regulation, industrial expansion, and \u201cgreen\u201d transformation. However, all of these things are still at an early stage of implementation. It remains to be seen if they will be enough to keep an unfettered American executive branch in check.<\/p>\n

A Revolution Foretold<\/h2>\n

Trump\u2019s erratic behaviour during his first term made him hard to predict. But things may be different the second time around, not least thanks to a wide-ranging strategic plan published by a right-wing think tank. As previously with Ronald Reagan, a conservative coalition centred on the Heritage Foundation has set about formulating the institutional and political direction of a \u201cnew conservative movement,\u201d while also securing the project\u2019s implementation in financial and structural terms. A second Trump term will be a revolution foretold. Europeans must take these strategic statements both literally and seriously. Not to do so would be an act of gross negligence.<\/p>\n

In his first term in office, Trump\u2019s worst impulses were thwarted by advisers, Congress, and the US civil service. Every chapter of the Heritage Foundation\u2019s Mandate for Leadership: the Conservative Promise<\/strong> hammers home this point, insisting that advisers and career civil servants be quickly brought into ideological line.<\/p>\n

It suggests that the civil service must be immediately gutted: 54,000 Trump \u201cloyalists\u201d \u2013 a list which has already been put together \u2013 are to be brought into government as quickly as possible. Ambassadors will be mainly \u201cpolitical\u201d appointments, while both the State department and foreign aid will see severe structural cuts. \u201cInstitutionalizing Trumpism\u201d will unquestionably mean that \u201cpeople will lose their jobs,\u201d Kevin Roberts, head of the Heritage Foundation, told The New York Times. \u201cHopefully their lives are able to flourish in spite of that,\u201d he added cynically.<\/p>\n

These anti-democratic strategies alone should make clear to Europeans that they will no longer be able to arrange things with \u201cTrump the dealmaker,\u201d as was still possible after he came to power in 2017. At that time, competing approaches to managing Trump created much discord in the European Union, with the US government happily playing the Europeans off against each other. In a second term, this approach will be turned into a strategy: Page 188 of the Heritage Foundation\u2019s manifesto recommends that the United States should \u201c[develop] new allies inside the EU \u2013 especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU.\u201d<\/p>\n

Creative Diplomacy<\/h2>\n

How should Europeans interpret the key messages of the conservative manifesto? How can they prepare in the months leading up the election? The answer must be to use creative diplomacy to communitise, multilateralise, and diversify the achievements of the transatlantic alliance.<\/p>\n

Trump intends to divide Europeans. He will use the secret services as an \u201cinformation weapon,\u201d change sanctions policy, and effectively shut down NATO. The Europeans could have offered responses to all of these policies at the Munich Security Conference in February. They could have highlighted decisions that have already been taken, including the new framework structure for the joint purchase of ammunition agreed by several European NATO states.<\/p>\n

Imagine German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb together on a single stage, jointly announcing the financial and functional expansion of the hitherto impoverished European Peace Facility. Imagine a presentation of a framework agreement on new sanctions against domestic and foreign companies and individuals, citing examples of efficient European law enforcement.<\/p>\n

European countries could also have announced improved defence cooperation and closer intelligence exchange with countries of the \u201cexpanded West,\u201d such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. It speaks volumes that the joint \u201cEuropean Defence Industrial Strategy\u201d was not ready in time for the Munich Security Conference in February: The publication date had to be postponed from February to March. What we saw at Munich was missed opportunities for sending diplomatic signals, and for actual consolidation in European defence and foreign policy.<\/p>\n

But the new US conservative manifesto does hold some good news for Europeans: Trump will look to secure the Arctic more strongly against Russian and Chinese interests, something everyone in NATO has wanted for years. The plan to displace the Chinese Silk Road \u2013 the G7\u2019s \u201cBuild Back Better World\u201d plan \u2013\u00a0must also be pushed forward by Europe. We could see new opportunities for the EU\u2019s \u201cGlobal Gateway\u201d connectivity initiative, as well as for European relations with the Global South under transatlantic auspices.<\/p>\n

Hard Times on Energy, Trade, and Climate<\/h2>\n

In other policy areas, however, it will be much harder to find options to quickly and effectively counteract the possible plans of a Trump II administration. The interdependencies are simply too strong, above all because of the Ukraine crisis.<\/p>\n

This is why conservatives have already fought so hard with the Biden administration on these topics. Energy, trade, withdrawal from international organisations: All of this will be approached in a spirit of retaliation. \u201cWar councils\u201d will emerge that will encompass members of the Commerce and Energy Departments as well as the Pentagon.<\/p>\n

Trump wants to use energy and trade policy to take revenge on China, on Europe, and on the international system in general. He will ignore moderate voices. According to the manifesto, negotiation with China is simply not worth it. This marks another departure from Biden\u2019s policies, and it will be poison for the European Union\u2019s de-risking projects in this context.<\/p>\n

Emergency Preparedness<\/h2>\n

The possibility of a new Trump administration imposing punitive tariffs means the EU must immediately strengthen its internal market. But in addition to this, the EU must prevent damage to its own economy by identifying industries and products which could offer a response to new tariffs. Speaking of damage: Experts already estimate that Trump\u2019s protectionist stance will cost over half a million American jobs.<\/p>\n

The conservative manifesto plays directly into China\u2019s hands by proposing to withdraw the United States from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, and possibly the World Trade Organization. At Davos this year, the Chinese premier Li Qiang announced the end of Western-led multilateralism, offering the existing 22 Chinese-led institutions as a possible replacement.<\/p>\n

EU member states need to go back to the drawing board and begin planning how they can invest sustainably in Western-led multilateralism, despite budget shortfalls. This time, a straightforward \u201calliance for multilateralism\u201d will not be enough.<\/p>\n

As a form of government, democracy has been the exception throughout recent human history. Autocracies remain the norm. If the European Union, the world\u2019s longest-lived project for peace, is to endure, it must remain vigilant and listen carefully when confronted with anti-democratic change, especially when that change impacts the world\u2019s oldest constitutional democracy. If it does not, events will force it to.<\/p>\n

About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n

Cathryn Cl\u00fcver Ashbrook is a Senior Advisor in the Europe\u2019s Future programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung.<\/p>\n

Read more articles on our\u00a02024 European Elections page<\/a>.<\/p>\n","excerpt":"

Translated from German by Dr. Br\u00edan Hanrahan Europe will see elections to the European Parliament in June, while the United […]<\/p>\n","thumbnail":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2023\/07\/us-eu-flags.jpg","thumbnailsquare":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2023\/07\/us-eu-flags.jpg","authors":[{"id":30870,"name":"Cathryn Cl\u00fcver Ashbrook","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/blogger\/cathryn-cluver-ashbrook\/"}],"categories":[{"id":597,"name":"Europe in the World","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/category\/europe-in-the-world\/"}],"tags":[{"id":202,"name":"eu","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/eu\/"},{"id":586,"name":"eu elections","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/eu-elections\/"},{"id":584,"name":"eu elections 2024","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/eu-elections-2024\/"},{"id":263,"name":"European Union","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/european-union\/"}]}