{"id":33729,"title":"Dutch Elections: The End of the EU\u2019s Pragmatic Dealmaker?","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/miscellaneous\/dutch-elections-2023\/","date":"20. November 2023","date_unix":1700493420,"date_modified_unix":1748337342,"date_iso":"2023-11-20T15:17:00+00:00","content":"

This week, the Netherlands heads to the polls. For the first time in 13 years, outgoing prime minister Mark Rutte is not on the ballot. Domestically, the election offers an opportunity to turn the page on an inheritance of intractable issues and scandals that hamstrung the last few governments headed by Rutte. For Europe, however, the changing of the guard may end the Netherlands\u2019 recent role as an EU deal-broker. The Dutch electoral landscape is fragmented and volatile. Up to sixteen parties may end up in parliament. But while the Dutch might become a diminished force, it would be a mistake to completely write off their instinct for pragmatic dealmaking in Europe, especially if Franco-German relations continue to be poor. \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

The Netherlands as EU locomotive rather than brake<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The election matters for the EU because the Netherlands is often a pivotal player. It is the biggest of the EU\u2019s small economies and a large net contributor to the EU budget. The importance of the dynamic Dutch economy for the eurozone is growing. Germany\u2019s economy has been stagnant<\/a> for years, while the dynamic Dutch economy is now more than 6% larger than its pre-pandemic size. The country boasts Europe\u2019s biggest port with Rotterdam and is home to its most important technology company, ASML, which has been at the heart of Washington\u2019s efforts<\/a> to cajole Europe into also throttling China\u2019s access to semiconductors.<\/p>\n

In the pre-pandemic era, the Netherlands leveraged such structural strengths to lead a coalition of small \u2018frugal\u2019 countries called the New Hanseatic League. The League vocally\u00a0opposed\u00a0<\/a>further EU fiscal integration. But, especially after the pandemic and Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, Rutte turned the country into more of a constructive bridge-builder. This included forging compromises between the Netherlands\u2019 traditional ally, Germany, and Macron\u2019s France.<\/p>\n

Rutte\u2019s last cabinet completed the transformation. Former UN diplomat Sigrid Kaag became finance minister, foregoing the brazen fiscal hawkishness of her predecessor Wopke Hoekstra that had irked<\/a> member-states in southern Europe. Now, at the helm of the foreign office, Hoekstra took a more conciliatory stance. He, for example, joined a coalition of countries<\/a> that called for a shift from unanimity to qualified-majority voting on EU foreign policy.<\/p>\n

Rather than be the party of \u2018no\u2019, this government sought partners all over the Union. It pushed<\/a> alongside member-states in central and eastern Europe for more advanced arms deliveries to Ukraine.\u00a0The Dutch also toned<\/a> down their traditional hostility to EU enlargement, instead emphasising the need for full compliance with rule-of-law and other milestones for the countries in the EU waiting room. And they even teamed up with Spain, a high-debt country, to lay the\u00a0blueprint\u00a0<\/a>for the ongoing reform of the EU\u2019s rules governing public debt and deficits. The Financial Times aptly summarised<\/a> this new approach as \u201cDutch vow to be EU locomotive rather than brake\u201d.<\/p>\n

This newfound role for the Netherlands stabilised the EU at a time when the Franco-German relationship, which had previously powered Union initiatives, was\u00a0fraying<\/a>. Paris and Berlin have had repeated spats<\/a> over energy and whether to buy weapons from the United States or produce them in Europe.<\/p>\n

A national campaign about restoring trust in government<\/strong><\/h2>\n

However, the Dutch government was divided and weak at home. The coalition was burdened<\/a> by attempts to resolve a scandal in which tax officials wrongly accused thousands of parents of fraud based on ethnic profiling. Coalition partners continually argued over migration. And they were locked<\/a> in an intractable stalemate with protesting farmers about how to reduce nitrogen emissions from intensive farming. The subsequent government collapse<\/a> ended Rutte, Kaag and Hoekstra\u2019s national political careers.<\/p>\n

On the surface, the election campaign that ensued has lacked a core theme. European issues certainly barely featured<\/a>. The overarching sentiment of the campaign seems to have been fatigue with, or even a repudiation of, the transactional, backroom-dealing style of power politics that marked Rutte\u2019s years in charge. This may have served him to forge deals at the European level, but at the national level it increasingly fuelled scandals and resentment over a lack of accountability.<\/p>\n

Instead, the parties in the campaign have ended up battling over \u2018bestaanszekerheid\u2019, which can be roughly translated as \u2018livelihood security\u2019. Strikingly, even the centre-right VVD campaigned<\/a> on this terrain, which one would traditionally associate more with the left or centre-left. The cost-of-living crisis, along with most of the coalition\u2019s disputes, can be subsumed<\/a> under this banner. What has been on the ballot with \u2018bestaanszekerheid\u2019 is perhaps not so much a set of issues but repairing citizens\u2019 trust in government itself.<\/p>\n

Campaign dynamics<\/strong><\/h2>\n

As a result, the turning points in the election campaign were driven less by substantive debates and more by changes in political personnel. The first was Rutte\u2019s party\u2019s choice of successor as leader of the centre-right VVD: justice and security minister Dilan Ye\u015filg\u00f6z-Zegerius. She campaigned on tough migration limits and otherwise ran a media-savvy campaign in the spirit<\/a> of Mark Rutte\u2019s solutions-over-grand-visions mantra. A strong showing in opinion polls suggests she retained the loyalty of the VVD\u2019s pro-business, low-tax base.<\/p>\n

Another move that upended the race was the return of European Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans to\u00a0head up\u00a0<\/a>a newly created joint social democratic-green list. The joining of forces of Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) and Groenlinks under Timmermans gave the alliance an enduring polling bump, although not enough to overtake the VVD.<\/p>\n

The most profound upheaval was charismatic member of parliament Pieter Omtzigt entering the race with his own \u2018New Social Contract\u2019 (NSC) party. Omtzigt made his name by relentlessly<\/a> holding the government to account in the childcare benefits scandal despite his then-party being in the government. He was then ruthlessly side-lined<\/a> by Rutte and his own CDA leadership for a position in the last coalition negotiations in 2021. This contributed to him leaving<\/a> the party and ultimately founding his own. But it also bolstered his image as a principled champion of the people. He has campaigned mainly on restoring the integrity of the state. Otherwise, he has portrayed himself as a centrist: conservative on immigration and climate change but leftist on reducing poverty and improving healthcare.<\/p>\n

Finally, the anti-migrant, anti-EU, extreme right voter bloc seems to be travelling back to Geert Wilders\u2019 PVV from his newer competitors on the far right.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the surge in the BoerBurgerBeweging (BBB), a farmers\u2019 party protesting the nitrogen reduction targets, has deflated.<\/p>\n

The result has been a four-way race between the VVD, Groenlinks-PvdA, NSC and PVV for the top spot in a profoundly fragmented political landscape. The party that wins the most seats can traditionally lead coalition negotiations. Omtzigt has dithered on whether he wants to become prime minister. But even if the VVD wins, and Ye\u015filg\u00f6z becomes the first female Dutch prime minister, it will be hard to forge a majority without Omtzigt\u2019s party<\/a>. Timmermans faces the same constraint. So, the crux is whether Omtzigt will opt to govern over the centre, left or right. Omtzigt has kept his options open but sees a government over the right<\/a> as \u2018more realistic\u2019.<\/p>\n

Dutch orthodoxy and pragmatism on Europe are poised to return<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The era of the Dutch being a constructive and agenda-setting dealmaker in the EU is probably weaker for now. A wave of senior party leaders with experience on the EU stage has retired from national politics. Rutte started his many years in office with occasional EU-sceptic notes. But the EU solidarity he felt in 2014 after the loss of many Dutch lives in the downing of the MH17 jet convinced him to solve more of his political problems by engaging the EU. It may take some time for his successor to draw the same lesson. Many of her possible coalition partners, like NSC and the BBB farmers party, are frequently critical of the EU. Omtzigt last weekend said that, while he does not agree with Viktor Orb\u00e1n, the Dutch must take a much tougher stance<\/a> in the EU like Hungary and Poland do. Wilders is outright hostile to the EU. As a result, any new government will probably be more hesitant to sign up to \u2013 let alone push \u2013 EU initiatives.<\/p>\n

Certainly, on European economic policy, a return to Dutch orthodoxy is likely unless a coalition dominated by the left emerges. Both the VVD and Omtzigt\u2019s NSC stress that they are opposed to giving the EU its own resources or taxation or further EU debt-issuance. With the VVD, NSC and PVV in the top-four parties, the Dutch tone on curbing migration will also harden in the EU arena. Dutch voters are generally sceptical<\/a> of giving the EU more competences.<\/p>\n

But while the Netherlands is less likely to actively shape the EU economic agenda, the country has frequently been more pragmatic than its rhetoric. This was true even in the era of the New Hanseatic League. Take the EU\u2019s groundbreaking<\/a> \u20ac800bn post-pandemic recovery fund, agreed to in 2020. After objecting vehemently to common European debt issuance, the Dutch signed up to the fund on the condition<\/a> that it included an emergency brake for doling out cash to countries that do not fulfil certain conditions. That tool<\/a> is now part of the EU\u2019s most powerful weapon in the fight against democratic backsliding. Meanwhile, when it comes to sanctions on Russia, support for Ukraine, and European defence cooperation, the Dutch will continue to pull their weight. These initiatives still enjoy relatively widespread<\/a>, albeit somewhat declining, support amongst citizens.<\/p>\n

With their marriage in tatters, diplomats in Paris and Berlin should be watching the Netherlands\u2019 election results with jitters. Will they no longer be able to call on a government in the Hague to mediate their conflicts and help forge European deals? A balkanised Dutch parliament will undoubtedly complicate matters. It provides another stark reminder to France and Germany to repair their relationship. But the Netherlands has always been governed<\/a> by an amalgam of its political minorities able to hammer out coalitions, compromise and consensus. In the post-Rutte era, Dutch voters clamour for more transparent and principled governance at home. But that does not mean they want to completely forsake their country\u2019s long-standing pragmatism internationally. So, with time, the Dutch might once again grease the wheels of European decision-making. But the odds are that in the period ahead the Hague\u2019s tone vis-\u00e0-vis Brussels will harden. The brake may be back.<\/p>\n

About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sander Tordoir is senior economist at the Centre for European Reform. Sander works on eurozone monetary and fiscal policy, the institutional architecture of EMU, European integration as well as Germany\u2019s role in the EU.<\/p>\n

Read more<\/strong><\/p>\n

Turbulent Times in The Netherlands After Mark Rutte\u2019s Resignation<\/a><\/p>\n

Read more on elections that matter for the EU on the <\/strong>GED Elections Page<\/strong><\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n","excerpt":"

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