{"id":33209,"title":"Why Germany\u2019s Newly Released China Strategy is More Than Just a China Strategy","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/economy-security-trade\/why-germanys-newly-released-china-strategy-is-more-than-just-a-china-strategy\/","date":"18. Juli 2023","date_unix":1689666470,"date_modified_unix":1748337945,"date_iso":"2023-07-18T07:47:50+00:00","content":"<p><em>Germany&#8217;s first ever China Strategy is a symbol of a Zeitenwende in the <a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/globalization\/a-gloomy-outlook-for-eu-china-relations-divergence-distancing-decoupling\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >relations between Germany and China<\/a>. In the roughly one-year-and-a-half process of shaping the Strategy, however, the coalition government struggled hard to find common ground and struck a rather pragmatic compromise in the end.<\/em><em>\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Germany\u2019s traffic light coalition ambitiously stated the need for a \u201ccomprehensive China Strategy\u201d in its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spd.de\/fileadmin\/Dokumente\/Koalitionsvertrag\/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\"  target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">coalition agreement<\/a> published in December 2021. This kicked off the drafting of Germany\u2019s first-ever <a href=\"https:\/\/www.auswaertiges-amt.de\/blob\/2608580\/317313df4795e104f1ea3263d41860d8\/china-strategie-en-data.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >China Strategy<\/a>, which was finally released on July 13<sup>th<\/sup>, 2023. It was a complex and difficult process.<\/p>\n<p>Two drafts were leaked to the press over time, one from the German Foreign Ministry under Annalena Baerbock and one from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action under Robert Habeck, which were much sharper and more confrontational in tone.<\/p>\n<p>It became clear in the process, however, that the chancellery under Olaf Scholz was not on board with that approach. The release of the China Strategy was postponed until after the <a href=\"https:\/\/ip-quarterly.com\/en\/what-expect-germanys-china-strategy\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\"  target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">7<sup>th<\/sup> Sino-German intergovernmental consultations<\/a>, which had aspects of \u201cbusiness as usual\u201d in Germany\u2019s dealings with China.<\/p>\n<p>Now the Strategy is out, and of course, it is a compromise among chancellery, ministries involved and coalition parties. But it is still good to have it. \u00a0Never has China been discussed as much by so many as during the process of drafting the Strategy. All democratic parties, or at least party factions, have taken this as an occasion to discuss China internally and to issue their own position papers on China. And so did interest groups, think tanks, research institutes and many other stakeholders.<\/p>\n<p>This process was valuable in itself in recalibrating how Germany looks at and deals with China and bringing all issues at hand to the table. It became quickly clear that a China Strategy is not only about China but also, for example, about the \u201chomework\u201d that Germany and the European Union have to do to strengthen their capacity to act independently and more assertively with regard to China. I would therefore frame the topical areas included in the China Strategy as such: \u201cwith China\u201d, \u201cabout China\u201d, \u201cbeyond China\u201d, and \u201cabout ourselves\u201d.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>With China<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Very importantly, from a European perspective, right after the introduction, a whole chapter is dedicated to \u201cGermany\u2019s Strategy on China as part of the joint EU policy on China\u201d. It contains a clear commitment to an EU-wide coordinated approach towards China and for Germany to \u201calign its policy on China with that of Europe\u2019s\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Regarding Germany\u2019s bilateral relations <strong>with China<\/strong>, the Strategy is very clear on the challenges arising from China\u2019s civil, political and human rights violations, lack of reciprocity and its attempts \u201cto reshape the existing rules-based international order\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The Strategy acknowledges that China will remain an important economic partner and also \u201cis an essential partner as regards global challenges\u201d, such as tackling the climate crisis or preventing pandemics. The \u00a0EU\u2019s triad \u201cpartner, competitor and systemic rival\u201d is mentioned as an equal dimension, even though the focus has shifted towards rivalry, especially since <a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/ukrainianwar\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>About ourselves<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The chapter on \u201cStrengthening Germany and the EU\u201d is <strong>about ourselves <\/strong>(internal dimension) on the one hand and about China (external dimension) on the other. A clear focus is on \u201cthe integration and resilience of the EU internal market\u201d as the key to Europe\u2019s competitiveness and sovereignty.<\/p>\n<p>Measures <strong>about ourselves<\/strong>, i.e. doing our homework on the internal market, include: fostering innovation and production capacities (especially with regards to the green and digital transformation), advancing the capital markets and banking union, and creating an internationally attractive research and development landscape.<\/p>\n<p>The last part of the Strategy, which deals with building expertise on China, contains further measures about ourselves on the German level: it acknowledges the lack of sufficient China competence in Germany and the need to create and enhance competencies in all areas and on all levels of politics, the economy and society.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>About China<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Measures <strong>about China<\/strong> are framed alongside the concept of <a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/globalization\/why-de-risking-from-china-may-still-lead-to-de-coupling-for-certain-key-inputs-but-also-for-some-companies\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >de-risking<\/a> economic relations, put forward by Ursula von der Leyen in March, and deal with the question of how to reduce critical <a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/globalization\/germany-is-less-dependent-on-profits-from-china-than-assumed\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >dependencies<\/a> that make the EU and its member states susceptible to economic coercion.<\/p>\n<p>These measures include diversifying supply chains away from China, applying and enhancing the EU trade defence toolbox, an updated and separate German investment screening law, closer scrutiny of investment and export credit guarantees by the German government and a \u2013 rather weakly framed \u2013 appeal to companies to \u201ctake geopolitical risks sufficiently into account in their decision-making\u201d. It is at least cautiously mentioned that firms should internalise \u201ccluster risks\u201d to prevent the need for state-funded bailouts in the case of a crisis.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Beyond China<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The last part of the Strategy deals with \u201cInternational cooperation\u201d and thus goes <strong>beyond China<\/strong>. It manages to mention all five continents and makes clear that Germany and the EU have to substantially increase global engagement, especially with like-minded partners like the US and G7, but also with countries in the so-called Global South, to counter China\u2019s political initiatives that aim at reshaping the international order to be more aligned with China\u2019s goals and interests.<\/p>\n<p>Stronger regional cooperation, such as with the Indo-Pacific, free trade agreements, such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and also with the US are on the table again. Other measures to diversify German foreign relations away from China include a strong push for implementing the EU\u2019s Global Gateway Initiative and achieving a substantial reform of the WTO.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>What got \u201clost\u201d in the process<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>As can be seen from the above, the released Strategy contains some promising aspects and offers a comprehensive picture of relations with China and beyond. Compared with the leaked draft from the Foreign Office, however, some interesting aspects seem to have gotten lost in the compromise.<\/p>\n<p>Two of them are especially eye-catching from my point of view: First and probably most importantly from a European perspective, the language of an envisioned <em>Europeanization<\/em> of Sino-German intergovernmental consultations got toned down far too much: While the draft clearly states that participation by EU institutions <em>should be made possible<\/em>, the Strategy itself only mentions that case-by-case participation <em>will be explored<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>This is deplorable in so far as it somewhat counteracts the strong pledge for an EU-wide approach to China and risks a back to \u201cbusiness as usual\u201d in the consultations. The last round of talks, as stated above, certainly left this impression.<\/p>\n<p>The second aspect is the fact that the Strategy does not refer to China or its political system as authoritarian even once, while the older draft did so several times. In times of clearly acknowledged systemic rivalry (which certainly includes different political systems), it is difficult to understand why the direct language on this was dropped in the end. Empirical evidence is abundant.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/atlas.bti-project.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\"  target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Bertelsmann Transformation Index<\/a>, for example, which analyses transformation processes towards democracy and a market economy in 137 countries, clearly puts China in the category of \u201chard-line autocracy\u201d. The Strategy could have been candid about this important and defining difference that impacts German relations with China.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Outlook: After the Strategy, the real work at home and abroad begins<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Germany\u2019s first-ever China Strategy certainly is a <a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/europes-future\/zeitenwende-one-year-later-germany-caught-in-a-rut\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" ><em>Zeitenwende<\/em><\/a> in its approach towards its largest trade partner. Despite being a compromise, the Strategy takes a more sober and realistic view of mutual relations than Germany did in the past and makes clear that China is not only a foreign policy challenge but also a domestic one. Now that it has been released, the real work, i.e. concretisation of measures and their implementation, is just about to start.<\/p>\n<p>Stakeholders on all levels should be involved here. Implementation across all administrative levels \u2013 from federal states to districts and municipalities \u2013 is key, but it also poses great challenges as the awareness of China-related issues and closely linked China competence varies greatly in public administration.<\/p>\n<p>The Strategy promises to build more expertise on China, but will require that a substantial budget be allocated to this task. However, the Strategy also states that \u201cgiven the considerable demands on our public finances at present, we will strive to implement this Strategy at no additional cost to the overall federal budget.\u201d This raises concerns about whether the goal of increasing China competence in Germany to the extent needed will be achieved in time.<\/p>\n<p>A next important step for Germany is to really Europeanize the Strategy and take on a key role in shaping the EU\u2019s future policy on China. That also means striving more assertively for a coordinated European approach and prioritising EU interests over national and corporate interests, if necessary, to achieve this.<\/p>\n<p>However, given how the last round of intergovernmental consultations went and how the attempt to Europeanize the consultations was watered down, in the end, it leaves one wondering how serious Germany will really be about better coordinating China policy at the European level.<\/p>\n<p>To end on a more optimistic note, the Strategy is not carved in stone. Its evaluation and further development are already planned, and this is key to dealing with the dynamic, unstable and fast-changing international environment we are facing now and in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n<p><strong>About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"FindHit SCXW115830809 BCX2\" data-ccp-parastyle=\"No Spacing\">Cora<\/span><span class=\"NormalTextRun SCXW115830809 BCX2\" data-ccp-parastyle=\"No Spacing\">\u00a0Jungbluth is a senior expert in the\u00a0<\/span><span class=\"NormalTextRun SCXW115830809 BCX2\" data-ccp-parastyle=\"No Spacing\">Europe\u2019s Future Program<\/span><span class=\"NormalTextRun SCXW115830809 BCX2\" data-ccp-parastyle=\"No Spacing\"> at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Her research focus is on China, foreign direct investment and international trade (especially the role of emerging economies).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Read more<br \/>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/europes-future\/why-the-eus-visit-diplomacy-with-china-needs-a-radical-change\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >Why the EU\u2019s Visit Diplomacy with China Needs a Radical Change (globaleurope.eu)<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/globalization\/germany-is-less-dependent-on-profits-from-china-than-assumed\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >Germany is Less Dependent on Profits From China Than Assumed (globaleurope.eu)<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/globalization\/asia-pacific-the-test-case-for-a-geopolitical-eu-trade-strategy\/\" target=\"_blank\" aria-label=\"\u00d6ffnet in einem neuen Tab\" >Asia Pacific: The Test Case for a Geopolitical EU Trade Strategy (globaleurope.eu)<\/a><\/p>\n","excerpt":"<p>Germany&#8217;s first ever China Strategy is a symbol of a Zeitenwende in the relations between Germany and China. In the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","thumbnail":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2023\/04\/FDI_Studie_Titelseite.jpg","thumbnailsquare":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2023\/04\/FDI_Studie_Titelseite.jpg","authors":[{"id":2725,"name":"Cora Jungbluth","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/blogger\/dr-cora-jungbluth\/"}],"categories":[{"id":596,"name":"Economic Security &amp; Trade","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/category\/economy-security-trade\/"}],"tags":[{"id":268,"name":"China","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/china\/"},{"id":263,"name":"European Union","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/european-union\/"},{"id":323,"name":"Germany","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/tag\/germany\/"}]}