The Sceptics & the Optimists<\/strong><\/h2>\nOver the past 15 years, the EU hasn\u2019t been short on crises. The decade after the 2008 global financial crisis started with the 2010 Euro crisis, followed by the 2015 migration crisis, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016, Covid-19 and now Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine. Today\u2019s EU was forged by the crises it endured, and, in hindsight, it hasn\u2019t been so bad at handling them.<\/p>\n
Despite the many crises Europeans have had to live through, 44% of EU citizens believe the EU is trending in the right direction \u2013 a value that has been consistently \u00a0rising since 2015. 53% continue to believe that we need closer European political and economic integration<\/a>, while just 29% think we need less.<\/p>\n![\"graph:](\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2022\/07\/chart_5-1024x451.png\" "\\"graph:")
<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Many, however, are unsatisfied with the EU\u2019s crisis-led and seemingly ad-hoc approach: too little strategic foresight, too little visionary thinking and, perhaps most importantly, too little agency. The EU shouldn\u2019t be merely in a reactionary role subject to larger global pressures but should sit in the driver\u2019s seat instead. \u2018Muddling through\u2019 repeated crises and brokering (sometimes last-minute) compromises cannot possibly be it, the intuition goes. Or is it?<\/p>\n
Political theorist David Runciman (2013<\/a>) came up with the provocative hypothesis that this may, in fact, \u2018be it.\u2019 He argues that democracies\u2019 tendency to \u2018muddle through,\u2019 despite their sometimes-messy appearance, is not a vice but a virtue. Reviewing some of the biggest crises of the last century, he concludes that \u2018muddling through\u2019 isn\u2019t some form of extraordinary crisis mode but the modus operandi of advanced democracies.<\/p>\nThis goes for complicated unions of states like the EU in particular. He believes that democracies\u2019 ability to adapt on short notice is one of the key reasons they tend to outlive autocracies which lack such flexibility and have less margin for error.<\/p>\n
Attempts to formulate grand visions and pin down what makes for a sound democracy, Runciman says, are futile and fail to consider that their major strength may be right before our eyes: flexibility and the ability to \u2018experiment on the margins.\u2019 Does that mean that we are going to be fine no matter what? Unfortunately, it does not.<\/p>\n
\u2018The Confidence Trap\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\nFirst, the very reason that democracies have been so successful at muddling through crises in the past may give rise to a dangerous state of complacency that things will eventually turn out well again. Runciman calls this the \u2018confidence trap<\/a>.\u2019 Politicians and the broader public become tempted to observe crises from a distance up until they become matters of acute urgency.<\/p>\nAs such, democracies\u2019 very success in the past increases their risk of failure in the present. Since Runciman published his book in 2013, this risk appears to have materialised.<\/p>\n
Speaking of Europe, he wrote that \u201cfor most of us, democracy is still the only game in town.\u201d This has since changed. For the first time since 2004, Bertelsmann Stiftung\u2019s BTI index<\/a> registers more autocratic than democratic states.<\/p>\nOut of 137 investigated countries, 67 qualify as democracies, while 70 qualify as autocracies. What\u2019s more, the annually published 2022 V-Dem Democracy report<\/a> lists Poland and Hungary, two EU member states, as two of the top five autocracies. In other words, democracies can and do fail and failing to realize this may make them more likely to fail.<\/p>\nThis time is different? <\/strong><\/h2>\nAnother problem that comes with drawing encouragement from the successful resolution of past crises is that it\u2019s very hard to gauge whether this time is different (Runciman 2013). Crises do not always come in the \u2018right\u2019 dose \u2013serious enough to trigger real change, yet without danger of getting out of control.<\/p>\n
Experimenting in the wild does carry very real risks. Climate change is just one, albeit the most drastic, example. Most scientific evidence suggests that it is quite clear that \u2018this time IS different.\u2019 This moment doesn\u2019t fit any of our previous crisis categories.<\/p>\n
This crisis requires the very kind of pre-emptive action with which democracies have tended to struggle. Waiting out this crisis and only acting until it becomes visibly acute in all its consequences won\u2019t work. Have EU citizens sensed this presumably weak spot? Asked about whether they believe autocracies are better equipped than democracies to tackle the climate crisis, 43% say yes.<\/p>\n
![\"graph:](\"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2022\/07\/visual-new-2.png\")
<\/p>\n
Of course, this doesn\u2019t mean that they wish to live in autocracies, nor that autocracies are better equipped to tackle climate change. In fact, there is evidence<\/a> to suggest the opposite. What it may suggest, however, is that European citizens deem a kind of authoritative action necessary that liberal democracies have traditionally refrained from doing.<\/p>\nMany politicians understand that the time to act is now. And yet, gathering support for prediction-based politics isn\u2019t easy. With climate change, however, waiting for predictions to come true would be too late. The act-on-acute-crisis-and-muddle-through approach won\u2019t work.<\/p>\n
Crisis-jumping<\/strong><\/h2>\nWaiting for crises to become acute and tackle them in one big collaborative effort, as we so often do in the EU, may not necessarily yield worse decisions, but it also doesn\u2019t guarantee better ones either. More problematically, however, reserving moments of genuine change to moments of acute crisis does tend to divert attention away from ongoing, maybe less flashy but no less dangerous, crises.<\/p>\n
Take the EU\u2019s in-house crisis on the rule of law and democratic backsliding. Prior to Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, Poland and Hungary were increasingly mentioned jointly as far as their rule-of-law issues are concerned. This has changed.<\/p>\n
Their diametrically opposed reactions to Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine make it hard to lump them together on anything. While Poland has proved a key supporter of Ukraine, Orban\u2019s regime keeps its close ties with Putin. Unfortunately, this doesn\u2019t mean much has changed with Poland\u2019s rule of law issues.<\/p>\n
On the contrary, several commentators cannot help but get the impression that Poland is exploiting one crisis to distract from another. As Ben Staley recently put it<\/a>, \u201cthere\u2019s a strategy to emotionally blackmail the EU into taking a softer line, (\u2026) an attempt to refashion the discourse, to say: \u2018We\u2019re trying to deal with real problems; you\u2019re just hindering us with all this rule-of-law stuff\u2019\u201d.<\/p>\nMost recently, the Polish government is trying to position itself on the moral high grounds by deliberately refusing to insist on an EU-wide distribution of Ukrainian refugees, just 7 years after they refused to take in almost any refugees during the 2015 migration crisis.<\/p>\n
From major weakness to major strength and back again?<\/strong><\/h2>\nLurching from one crisis to the next, and letting one\u2019s politics be guided by them, risks obscuring the fact that previous crises hadn\u2019t actually been resolved. One of the formative strengths of modern democracies may thus turn into one of their formative weaknesses in the longer run. Their ability and propensity to tackle the most acute crises first may push less \u2018flashy\u2019 or systemic crises further and further out.<\/p>\n
Until that is, they turn into truly existential and unpostponable crises themselves. For the EU, issues with democracy and the rule of law in member states are one example. For the planet, the climate crisis is another.<\/p>\n
What can be done?<\/strong><\/h2>\nSo, what can be done? Considering that crises will continue to come our way and require our immediate attention, not much, it seems. However, realising that things can go wrong seems like a good mindset to adopt. Runciman\u2019s \u2018confidence trap\u2019 may very well be real. At the same time, articulating grander strategic visions for the future is important too. Even if such visions, outshined by more pressing issues, may not be picked up on immediately, they tend to be picked up later.<\/p>\n
Take some of the EU\u2019s more structured reactions to Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine, whether that is better coordination and financing of defence, debates about (models of) EU enlargement and the unanimity principle in matters of foreign affairs. None of these are genuinely new ideas. They have repeatedly been floated and discussed before and are now on the top of the agenda.<\/p>\n
Explicitly formulating such visions as genuinely European<\/em> visions is just as important. For if they keep coming from individual member states, often the biggest and\/or most vocal ones, the European Union runs the risk of camp building and potential division.<\/p>\nLastly, and perhaps most importantly, muddling through must not be at the expense of transparency<\/a>. If it does, trust is compromised and gathering support for far-reaching and drastic political decisions becomes very difficult.<\/p>\neupinions<\/strong><\/a> is the platform for European public opinion of Bertelsmann Stiftung. Since 2015, eupinions surveys EU citizens\u2019 public opinion on matters of European integration, democracy, globalization and people\u2019s economic situation on a quarterly basis.<\/strong><\/p>\nAbout the author<\/strong><\/p>\nHardy Schilgen is project manager at eupinions. eupinions is the platform for European public opinion of Bertelsmann Foundation. Since 2015, eupinions surveys EU citizens\u2019 public opinion on matters of European integration, democracy, globalization and people\u2019s economic situation on a quarterly basis.<\/p>\n
Read More Data Stories from eupinions \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean citizens back help for Ukraine. Meanwhile, their personal prospects are deteriorating<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n
<\/p>\n Many, however, are unsatisfied with the EU\u2019s crisis-led and seemingly ad-hoc approach: too little strategic foresight, too little visionary thinking and, perhaps most importantly, too little agency. The EU shouldn\u2019t be merely in a reactionary role subject to larger global pressures but should sit in the driver\u2019s seat instead. \u2018Muddling through\u2019 repeated crises and brokering (sometimes last-minute) compromises cannot possibly be it, the intuition goes. Or is it?<\/p>\n Political theorist David Runciman (2013<\/a>) came up with the provocative hypothesis that this may, in fact, \u2018be it.\u2019 He argues that democracies\u2019 tendency to \u2018muddle through,\u2019 despite their sometimes-messy appearance, is not a vice but a virtue. Reviewing some of the biggest crises of the last century, he concludes that \u2018muddling through\u2019 isn\u2019t some form of extraordinary crisis mode but the modus operandi of advanced democracies.<\/p>\n This goes for complicated unions of states like the EU in particular. He believes that democracies\u2019 ability to adapt on short notice is one of the key reasons they tend to outlive autocracies which lack such flexibility and have less margin for error.<\/p>\n Attempts to formulate grand visions and pin down what makes for a sound democracy, Runciman says, are futile and fail to consider that their major strength may be right before our eyes: flexibility and the ability to \u2018experiment on the margins.\u2019 Does that mean that we are going to be fine no matter what? Unfortunately, it does not.<\/p>\n First, the very reason that democracies have been so successful at muddling through crises in the past may give rise to a dangerous state of complacency that things will eventually turn out well again. Runciman calls this the \u2018confidence trap<\/a>.\u2019 Politicians and the broader public become tempted to observe crises from a distance up until they become matters of acute urgency.<\/p>\n As such, democracies\u2019 very success in the past increases their risk of failure in the present. Since Runciman published his book in 2013, this risk appears to have materialised.<\/p>\n Speaking of Europe, he wrote that \u201cfor most of us, democracy is still the only game in town.\u201d This has since changed. For the first time since 2004, Bertelsmann Stiftung\u2019s BTI index<\/a> registers more autocratic than democratic states.<\/p>\n Out of 137 investigated countries, 67 qualify as democracies, while 70 qualify as autocracies. What\u2019s more, the annually published 2022 V-Dem Democracy report<\/a> lists Poland and Hungary, two EU member states, as two of the top five autocracies. In other words, democracies can and do fail and failing to realize this may make them more likely to fail.<\/p>\n Another problem that comes with drawing encouragement from the successful resolution of past crises is that it\u2019s very hard to gauge whether this time is different (Runciman 2013). Crises do not always come in the \u2018right\u2019 dose \u2013serious enough to trigger real change, yet without danger of getting out of control.<\/p>\n Experimenting in the wild does carry very real risks. Climate change is just one, albeit the most drastic, example. Most scientific evidence suggests that it is quite clear that \u2018this time IS different.\u2019 This moment doesn\u2019t fit any of our previous crisis categories.<\/p>\n This crisis requires the very kind of pre-emptive action with which democracies have tended to struggle. Waiting out this crisis and only acting until it becomes visibly acute in all its consequences won\u2019t work. Have EU citizens sensed this presumably weak spot? Asked about whether they believe autocracies are better equipped than democracies to tackle the climate crisis, 43% say yes.<\/p>\n Of course, this doesn\u2019t mean that they wish to live in autocracies, nor that autocracies are better equipped to tackle climate change. In fact, there is evidence<\/a> to suggest the opposite. What it may suggest, however, is that European citizens deem a kind of authoritative action necessary that liberal democracies have traditionally refrained from doing.<\/p>\n Many politicians understand that the time to act is now. And yet, gathering support for prediction-based politics isn\u2019t easy. With climate change, however, waiting for predictions to come true would be too late. The act-on-acute-crisis-and-muddle-through approach won\u2019t work.<\/p>\n Waiting for crises to become acute and tackle them in one big collaborative effort, as we so often do in the EU, may not necessarily yield worse decisions, but it also doesn\u2019t guarantee better ones either. More problematically, however, reserving moments of genuine change to moments of acute crisis does tend to divert attention away from ongoing, maybe less flashy but no less dangerous, crises.<\/p>\n Take the EU\u2019s in-house crisis on the rule of law and democratic backsliding. Prior to Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, Poland and Hungary were increasingly mentioned jointly as far as their rule-of-law issues are concerned. This has changed.<\/p>\n Their diametrically opposed reactions to Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine make it hard to lump them together on anything. While Poland has proved a key supporter of Ukraine, Orban\u2019s regime keeps its close ties with Putin. Unfortunately, this doesn\u2019t mean much has changed with Poland\u2019s rule of law issues.<\/p>\n On the contrary, several commentators cannot help but get the impression that Poland is exploiting one crisis to distract from another. As Ben Staley recently put it<\/a>, \u201cthere\u2019s a strategy to emotionally blackmail the EU into taking a softer line, (\u2026) an attempt to refashion the discourse, to say: \u2018We\u2019re trying to deal with real problems; you\u2019re just hindering us with all this rule-of-law stuff\u2019\u201d.<\/p>\n Most recently, the Polish government is trying to position itself on the moral high grounds by deliberately refusing to insist on an EU-wide distribution of Ukrainian refugees, just 7 years after they refused to take in almost any refugees during the 2015 migration crisis.<\/p>\n Lurching from one crisis to the next, and letting one\u2019s politics be guided by them, risks obscuring the fact that previous crises hadn\u2019t actually been resolved. One of the formative strengths of modern democracies may thus turn into one of their formative weaknesses in the longer run. Their ability and propensity to tackle the most acute crises first may push less \u2018flashy\u2019 or systemic crises further and further out.<\/p>\n Until that is, they turn into truly existential and unpostponable crises themselves. For the EU, issues with democracy and the rule of law in member states are one example. For the planet, the climate crisis is another.<\/p>\n So, what can be done? Considering that crises will continue to come our way and require our immediate attention, not much, it seems. However, realising that things can go wrong seems like a good mindset to adopt. Runciman\u2019s \u2018confidence trap\u2019 may very well be real. At the same time, articulating grander strategic visions for the future is important too. Even if such visions, outshined by more pressing issues, may not be picked up on immediately, they tend to be picked up later.<\/p>\n Take some of the EU\u2019s more structured reactions to Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine, whether that is better coordination and financing of defence, debates about (models of) EU enlargement and the unanimity principle in matters of foreign affairs. None of these are genuinely new ideas. They have repeatedly been floated and discussed before and are now on the top of the agenda.<\/p>\n Explicitly formulating such visions as genuinely European<\/em> visions is just as important. For if they keep coming from individual member states, often the biggest and\/or most vocal ones, the European Union runs the risk of camp building and potential division.<\/p>\n Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, muddling through must not be at the expense of transparency<\/a>. If it does, trust is compromised and gathering support for far-reaching and drastic political decisions becomes very difficult.<\/p>\n eupinions<\/strong><\/a> is the platform for European public opinion of Bertelsmann Stiftung. Since 2015, eupinions surveys EU citizens\u2019 public opinion on matters of European integration, democracy, globalization and people\u2019s economic situation on a quarterly basis.<\/strong><\/p>\n About the author<\/strong><\/p>\n Hardy Schilgen is project manager at eupinions. eupinions is the platform for European public opinion of Bertelsmann Foundation. Since 2015, eupinions surveys EU citizens\u2019 public opinion on matters of European integration, democracy, globalization and people\u2019s economic situation on a quarterly basis.<\/p>\n Read More Data Stories from eupinions \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n European citizens back help for Ukraine. Meanwhile, their personal prospects are deteriorating<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n\u2018The Confidence Trap\u2019<\/strong><\/h2>\n
This time is different? <\/strong><\/h2>\n
<\/p>\nCrisis-jumping<\/strong><\/h2>\n
From major weakness to major strength and back again?<\/strong><\/h2>\n
What can be done?<\/strong><\/h2>\n