{"id":30589,"title":"China\u2019s Evolving Presence in Africa","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/economy-security-trade\/chinas-evolving-presence-in-africa\/","date":"28. Juni 2022","date_unix":1656414912,"date_modified_unix":1759824851,"date_iso":"2022-06-28T11:15:12+00:00","content":"

In the following blog post, Africa will refer to both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.<\/em><\/p>\n

China\u2019s engagement with the African continent has long raised concerns in European public debates and even more so among policymakers: the EU characterized Beijing\u2019s financing terms as unfavorable and opaque<\/a>. Widely regarded as a response to China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Brussels announced a \u20ac 150 billion Global Gateway Africa<\/a> investment scheme in early 2022.<\/p>\n

But what exactly does the Chinese economic footprint on the second largest continent look like and what are its wider consequences? The following seeks to contemplate this very question not only by focusing on implemented lending policies but also by considering developments in trade and investment.<\/p>\n

Trade <\/strong><\/h2>\n

China overtook the United States as Africa\u2019s largest bilateral trading partner in 2009, while the last year has spawned the largest two-way trade volume ever recorded:\u00a0 USD 254 billion<\/a>– up 35 percent from 2020.\u00a0 At the same time, the\u00a0 EU jointly recorded a trade volume of over \u00a0USD 300 billion<\/a>, exceeding China as a regional actor.<\/p>\n

Overall, Africa still amounts to no more than 4 percent of total Chinese trade, coming in behind Oceania and Latin America. Considering the fact that Morocco alone makes up 1 percent of total trade in goods<\/a>, Europeans have a deeper trade relationship, especially with North Africa.<\/p>\n

\"graph:<\/strong><\/p>\n

As can be seen in the graph, the previous years have been characterized by a consistent trade deficit with Africa. With respect to 2021, essential pandemic goods such as Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), pharmaceuticals and masks have boosted Chinese exports despite supply chain and other Covid-19-related disruptions.<\/p>\n

One of the key bodies for Sino-African relations, the Forum On China-Africa Cooperation<\/a> \u00a0(FOCAC), is held every three years to talk about a variety of issues concerning trade, investment, and other matters. At the 8th<\/sup> Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC last year in Dakar, Beijing declared that it seeks to import goods worth USD 300 billion over the next three years to counter the trade imbalance. The focus lies on increasing agricultural imports<\/a> through financial aid, as well as supporting the African Continental Free Trade Area, led by the African Union.<\/p>\n

To put this into perspective, this year\u2019s Sino-African deficit of around USD 43 billion is almost ten times larger than the EU\u2019s. Nevertheless, an important characteristic of European imports remains the dominance of primary goods, whereas Africa continues to import mostly manufactured ones.<\/p>\n

Regarding the top 5 Chinese trading partners on the continent, one observed two extremes in 2021: On the one hand, Nigeria, as well as Egypt, are among the largest importers of goods deriving from the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC)- their imports account for about 90 percent of two-way trade. A big share of these imports can be attributed to imports used for large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the\u00a0 Lagos-Ibadan railway<\/a> or Egypt\u2019s new administrative capital<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, resource-rich Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) almost exclusively recorded exports, in the form of crude petroleum<\/a> and copper<\/a> to the PRC, as their contribution to bilateral trade.<\/p>\n

Investment <\/strong><\/h2>\n

The case of FDI exemplifies the effect of declining U.S. efforts in Africa, as China\u2019s investment peaked in 2008 yet managed to surpass the US in 2013 as the largest equity investor. From a European perspective, the realm of FDI stock is the ground on which numerous countries, or at least their investors, outperform China: According to UNCTAD 2020 Investment Report, the Netherlands<\/a> was the largest stock investor, followed by the UK, France, the U.S. and China.<\/p>\n

\"graph:<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

As the graph illustrates, China\u2019s investment engagement focused primarily on infrastructure, while mining comes in second. Indeed, one-third of all African infrastructure built since 2010 was both financed and constructed by Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOE). The latter aspect of projects being carried out by Chinese entities has been at the forefront of criticism<\/a> over the last few years, questioning the benefit for locals and the lack of environmental or social standards.<\/p>\n

On the contrary, the European Commission emphasized that the EU is\u00a0 „taking into account the needs of our partner countries“<\/a> while launching a \u20ac 300 billion investment plan. However, given the sheer size of Sino-African projects, it is not farfetched to say that, at least during Beijing\u2019s heyday over the last decade or so, European finance was widely regarded as more complicated and less accessible.<\/p>\n

With respect to who it is that invests, 90 percent of the 10.000 Chinese companies in Africa are \u201cprivate,\u201d according to Professor Shirley Yu<\/a>, Director of the London School of Economics China-Africa Initiative. At this point, though, I should be clear that it is difficult to compare private firms from Europe with those from China, given the different economic and political systems in place.<\/p>\n

Having addressed the limited nature of Chinese private entities, Mrs. Yu still argues that it is the following commercial motives that increasingly drive FDI from the People\u2019s Republic, particularly for \u201d personal\u201d entities:<\/p>\n