{"id":28027,"title":"UK and EU Trade Strategies: Two Different Answers to Global Challenges","link":"https:\/\/bst-europe.eu\/de\/globalization\/uk-and-eu-trade-strategies-two-different-answers-to-global-challenges\/","date":"23. April 2021","date_unix":1619190571,"date_modified_unix":1644496088,"date_iso":"2021-04-23T15:09:31+00:00","content":"

In February, the EU published the \u201cTrade Policy Review<\/strong>,\u201d its new trade strategy. A month later, the \u201cIntegrated Review\u201d by the UK was put forward, sketching what \u201cGlobal Britain\u201d means post-Brexit. The two strategies are similar in their diagnosis of what is going on in the world \u2013 yet differ when it comes to what to prioritize. <\/em><\/p>\n

How to strategize \u2013 comparing apples with pears.<\/h2>\n

Comparing the \u201cIntegrated Review\u201d and the \u201cTrade Policy Review\u201d is not entirely fair. They are two different documents with different levels of ambition. The Trade Policy Review is a 23-page document outlining the EU\u2019s trade strategy<\/a> (which we discussed here<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The Integrated Review,<\/strong> on the other hand, is a 114 pages long, dealing with questions far beyond trade \u2013 it contains a holistic outlook on global megatrends. It outlines implications for UK policymaking across all policy fields with an international outlook, including security, diplomacy, trade, and several others. So, comparing the two documents is a bit like comparing apples and pears \u2013 they are not the same thing.<\/p>\n

Yet, both documents largely share the same vision<\/strong> of what is happening in the world. Both detect an increased linking of foreign policy and economic policy and geopolitics through economic means. They also agree that Europe\u2019s weight in the world economy is diminishing as Asia is increasingly becoming the economic center of gravity.<\/p>\n

China<\/strong> challenging the established global order is another commonality – explicit in the UK\u2019s strategy, but less so in the EU document. Technological transformation and climate change as a central challenge also feature in both strategies. Clearly, the diagnosis of what is going on in the world is mostly shared by both players, which makes the differences in the strategies all the more interesting.<\/p>\n

If the central challenge for international policies is the trend towards geoeconomics<\/strong> and that, consequently, foreign and trade policy cannot be treated separately, does it not make more sense to combine trade and foreign policies in one single strategy<\/a> (Read more on the implications of geoeconomic here<\/a>)?<\/p>\n

A central weakness of the EU trade strategy<\/strong> is that while it diagnoses geoeconomics as an important trend, it does not come up with an adequate response to this threat \u2013 perhaps precisely for the reason that it thinks not enough about trade as a tool for foreign policy. So, when it comes to the method of conceiving a strategy for the age of geoeconomics, the EU\u2019s \u201cgeopolitical commission\u201d can learn from the UK\u2019s approach.<\/p>\n

Some will argue that the EU could not link foreign and trade policy<\/strong> in a similar way, as the member states have a large degree of autonomy in the former. However, an exercise to develop a common strategic vision might be helpful to also achieve more coherence between the foreign policies of EU member states.<\/p>\n

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Diagnosis of global megatrends, taken from the UK\u2019s Integrated Review.<\/em><\/p>\n

Self-confidence vs. institution-building?<\/h2>\n

The central areas of action defined by the EU strategy are WTO reform<\/strong> and trade policy actions to underpin the EU sustainability and digital transitions. All three have to do with building institutions capable of addressing the important challenges of our time:<\/p>\n